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Abstract
We prove that there exists a constant  > 0 such that, assuming the Exponential Time
Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an -approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player
n× n game requires time nlog1−o(1) n. This matches (up to the o (1) term) the algorithm
of Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [54].
Our proof relies on a variety of techniques from the study of probabilistically checkable
proofs (PCP); this is the first time that such ideas are used for a reduction between
problems inside PPAD.
En route, we also prove new hardness results for computing Nash equilibria in games
with many players. In particular, we show that computing an -approximate Nash equi-
librium in a game with n players requires 2Ω(n) oracle queries to the payoff tensors. This
resolves an open problem posed by Hart and Nisan [43], Babichenko [13], and Chen et al.
[28]. In fact, our results for n-player games are stronger: they hold with respect to the
(, δ)-WeakNash relaxation recently introduced by Babichenko et al. [15].
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1 Introduction
For the past decade, the central open problem in equilibrium computation has been whether
two-player Nash equilibrium admits a PTAS. We had good reasons to be hopeful: there was a
series of improved approximation ratios [51, 34, 33, 23, 67] and several approximation schemes
for special cases [48, 35, 3, 17]. Yet most interesting are two inefficient algorithms for two-
player Nash:
• the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm [53] finds an exact Nash equilibrium in exponential
time; and
• a simple algorithm by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [54] finds an -Approximate Nash
Equilibrium in time nO(logn).
Although the Lemke-Howson algorithm takes exponential time, it has a special structure
which places the problem inside the complexity class PPAD [57]; i.e. it has a polynomial time
reduction to the canonical problem EndOfALine1:
Definition 1.1 (EndOfALine [32]). Given two circuits S and P , with m input bits and
m output bits each, such that P (0m) = 0m 6= S (0m), find an input x ∈ {0, 1}m such that
P (S (x)) 6= x or S (P (x)) 6= x 6= 0m.
Proving hardness for problems in PPAD is notoriously challenging because they are total,
i.e. they always have a solution, so the standard techniques from NP-hardness do not apply.
By now, however, we know that exponential and polynomial approximations for two-player
Nash are PPAD-complete ‘[32, 29], and so is -approximation for games with n players [62].
However, -approximation for two-player Nash is unlikely to have the same fate: otherwise,
the quasi-polynomial algorithm of [54] would refute the Exponential Time Hypothesis for
PPAD:
Hypothesis 1 (ETH for PPAD [15]). Solving EndOfALine requires time 2Ω˜(n).2
Thus the strongest hardness result we can hope to prove (given our current understanding
of complexity3) is a quasi-polynomial hardness that sits inside PPAD:
Theorem 1.2 (Main Theorem). There exists a constant  > 0 such that, assuming ETH for
PPAD, finding an -Approximate Nash Equilibrium in a two-player n× n game requires time
T (n) = nlog
1−o(1) n.
1.1 Techniques
Given an EndOfALine instance of size n, we construct a two-player N ×N game for N =
2n
1/2+o(1) whose approximate equilibria correspond to solutions to the EndOfALine instance.
Thus, assuming the “ETH for PPAD”, finding an approximate equilibrium requires time 2n =
N log
1−o(1)N .
1In the literature the problem has been called EndOfTheLine; we believe that the name EndOfALine
is a more accurate description.
2As usual, n is the size of the description of the instance, i.e. the size of the circuits S and P .
3Given our current understanding of complexity, refuting ETH for PPAD seems unlikely: there are matching
black-box lower bounds [45, 19]. Recall that the NP-analogue ETH [47] is widely used (e.g. [49, 55, 1, 25, 30]),
often in stronger variants such as SETH [46, 26] and NSETH [27].
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The main steps of the final construction are: (i) reducing EndOfALine to a new discrete
problem which we call LocalEndOfALine; (ii) reducing LocalEndOfALine to a problem
of finding an approximate Brouwer fixed point; (iii) reducing from Brouwer fixed point to
finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in a multiplayer game over n1/2+o(1) players with
2n
1/2+o(1) actions each; and (iv) reducing to the two-player game.
The main novelty in the reduction is the use of techniques such as error correcting codes
and probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) inside PPAD. In particular, the way we use
PCPs in our proof is very unusual.
Constructing the first gap: showing hardness of -SuccinctBrouwer2
The first step in all known PPAD-hardness results for (approximate) Nash equilibrium is
reducing EndOfALine to the problem of finding an (approximate) Brouwer fixed point of a
continuous, Lipschitz function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n. Let  > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant.
Previously, the state of the art for computational hardness of approximation of Brouwer fixed
points was:
Theorem 1.3 ([62], informal). It is PPAD-hard to find an x ∈ [0, 1]n such that
‖f (x)− x‖∞ ≤ .
Here and for the rest of the paper, all distances are relative; in particular, for x ∈ [0, 1]n
and p < q, we have ‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖q.
Theorem 1.3 implied that it is hard to find an x such that f (x) is approximately equal
to x on every coordinate. The first step in our proof is to strengthen this result to obtain
hardness of approximation with respect to 2-norm:
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). It is PPAD-hard to find an x ∈ [0, 1]n such that ‖f (x)− x‖2 ≤ .
Now, even finding an x such that f (x) is approximately equal to x on most of the coordi-
nates is already PPAD-hard.
Theorem 1.3 was obtained by adapting a construction due to Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and
Vavasis [45]. The main idea is to partition the [0, 1]n into 2n subcube, and consider the grid
formed by the subcube-centers; then embed a path (in fact, many paths and cycles when re-
ducing from EndOfALine) along an arbitrary sequence of neighboring grid-points/subcube-
centers. The function is carefully defined along the embedded path, guaranteeing both Lips-
chitz continuity and that approximate endpoints occur only near subcube-centers correspond-
ing to ends of paths.
Here we observe that if we want a larger displacement (in particular, constant relative 2-
norm) we actually want the consecutive vertices on the path to be as far as possible from each
other. We thus replace the neighboring grid-points with their encoding by an error correcting
code.
The first obstacle to using PCP-like techniques for problems in PPAD is their totality (i.e.
a solution always exists). For NP-hard problems, the PCP verifier expects the proof to be
encoded in some error correcting code. If the proof is far from any codeword, the verifier
detects that (with high probability), and immediately rejects. For problems in PPAD (more
generally, in TFNP) this is always tricky because it is not clear what does it mean “to reject”.
Hirsch et al.’s construction has the following useful property: for the vast majority of x’s (in
particular, all x’s far from the embedding of the paths) the displacement f (x)−x is the same
default displacement. Thus, when an x is too far from any codeword to faithfully decode it,
we can simply apply the default displacement.
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We note that Theorem 1.4 is already significant enough to obtain new results for many-
player games (see discussion in Subsection 1.2). Furthermore, its proof is relatively simple (in
particular, PCP-free) and is self-contained in Section 3.
The main challenge: locality.
Our ultimate goal is to construct a two-player game that simulates the Brouwer function from
Theorem 1.4. This is done via an imitation gadget: Alice’s mixed strategy induces a point
x(A) ∈ [0, 1]n; Bob’s strategy induces x(B) ∈ [0, 1]n; Alice wants to minimize ∥∥x(A) − x(B)∥∥
2
,
whereas Bob wants to minimize
∥∥f (x(A))− x(B)∥∥
2
. Alice and Bob are both satisfied at a
fixed point, where x(A) = x(B) = f
(
x(A)
)
.
The main obstacle is that we want to incentivize Bob to minimize
∥∥f (x(A))− x(B)∥∥
2
via
local constraints (payoffs - each depends on one pure strategy), while f
(
x(A)
)
has a global
dependency on Alice’s entire mixed strategy.
Our goal is thus to construct a hard Brouwer function that can be locally computed. How
local does the computation need to be? In a game of size 2
√
n×2
√
n, each strategy can faithfully
store information about
√
n bits. Specifically, our construction will be n1/2+o(1)-local.
We haven’t yet defined exactly what it means for our construction to be “n1/2+o(1)-local”;
the exact formulation is quite cumbersome as the query access needs to be partly adaptive,
robust to noise, etc. Eventually (Section 7), we formalize the “locality” of our Brouwer function
via a statement about multiplayer games. On a high level, however, our goal is to show that
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the j-th output fj (x) can be approximately computed, with high
probability, by accessing x at only n1/2+o(1) coordinates.
This is a good place to note that achieving any sense of “local computation” in our setting
is surprising, even if we consider just the error correcting encoding for our Brouwer function:
in order to maintain constant relative distance, an average bit of the output must depend on
a constant fraction of the input bits!
LocalEndOfALine
In order to introduce locality, we go back to the EndOfALine problem. “Wishful thinking”:
imagine that we could replace the arbitrary predecessor and successor circuits in EndOfALine
with NC0 (constant depth and constant fan-in) circuits Slocal, P local : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, so
that each output bit only depends on a constant number of input bits. Imagine further
that we had the guarantee that for each input, the outputs of Slocal, P local differ from the
input on just a constant number of bits. Additionally, it would be really nice if we had a
succinct pointer that immediately told us which bits are about to be replaced. (We later call
this succinct pointer the counter, because it also cycles through its possible values in a fixed
order.)
Suppose all our wishes came true, and furthermore the hard Brouwer function from The-
orem 1.4 used a linear error correcting code. Then, we could use the encoding of the counter,
henceforth C (u), to read only the bits that are about to be replaced, and the inputs that
determine the new values of those bits. Thus, using only local access to a tiny fraction of the
bits (|C (u)| + O (1)), we can construct a difference vector u − Slocal (u) (which is 0 almost
everywhere). As we discussed above, the encodings E (u) , E (Slocal (u)) must differ on a
constant fraction of the bits - but because the code is linear, we can also locally construct the
difference vector E (u)−E (Slocal (u)) = E (u− (Slocal (u))). Given E (u)−E (Slocal (u)),
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we can locally compute any bit of E (Slocal (u)) by accessing only the corresponding bit of
E (u).
Back to reality: unfortunately we do not know of a reduction to such a restricted variant
of EndOfALine. Surprisingly, we can almost do that. The problem LocalEndOfALine
(formally defined in Section 5) satisfies all the guarantees defined above, is linear-time reducible
from EndOfALine, but has one caveat: it is only defined on a strict subset V local of the
discrete hypercube (V local ( {0, 1}n). Verifying that a vertex belongs to V is quite easy -
it can be done in AC0. Let us take a brief break to acknowledge this new insight about the
canonical problem of PPAD:
Theorem 1.5. The predecessor and successor circuits of EndOfALine are, wlog, AC0 cir-
cuits.
The class AC0 is quite restricted, but the outputs of its circuits are not local functions of the
inputs. Now, we want to represent u in a way that will make it possible to locally determine
whether u ∈ V local or not. To this end we augment the linear error correcting encoding E (u)
with a probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) pi (u) of the statement (u ∈ V local).
Our holographic proof system
Some authors distinguish between PCPs and holographic proofs4: a PCP verifier has unre-
stricted access to the instance, and queries the proof locally; whereas the holographic proof
verifier has restricted, local access to both the proof and (an error correcting encoding of) the
instance. In this sense, what we actually want is a holographic proof.
We construct a holographic proof system with some very unusual properties. We are able
to achieve them thanks to our modest locality desideratum: n1/2+o(1), as opposed to the
typical polylog (n) or O (1). We highlight here a few of those properties; see Section 6 for
details.
• (Local proof construction) The most surprising property of our holographic proof
system is that the proof pi (u) can be constructed from local access to the encoding E (u).
In particular, note that we can locally compute E (Slocal (u)) because E (·) is linear -
but pi (·) is not. Once we obtain E (Slocal (u)), we can use local proof construction to
compute pi (Slocal (u)) locally.
• (Very low random-bit complexity) Our verifier is only allowed to use
(1/2 + o (1)) log2 n random bits - this is much lower even than the log2 n bits neces-
sary to choose one entry at random. In related works, similar random-bit complexity
was achieved by bundling the entries together via “birthday repetition”. To some extent,
something similar happens here, but our locality is already n1/2+o(1) so no bundling
(or repetition) is necessary. To achieve nearly optimal random-bit complexity, we use
λ-biased sets over large finite fields together with the Sampling Lemma of Ben-Sasson
et al. [21].
• (Tolerant verifier) Typically, a verifier must reject (with high probability) whenever
the input is far from valid, but it is allowed to reject even if the input is off by only
one bit. Our verifier, however, is required to accept (with high probability) inputs that
are close to valid proofs. (This is related to the notion of “tolerant testing”, which was
defined in [58] and discussed in [42] for locally testable codes.)
4In a nutshell, PCPs or holographic proofs are proofs that can be verified “locally” (with high probability)
by reading only a small (random) portion of the proof; see e.g. [7, Chapter 18] for many more details.
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• (Local decoding) We make explicit use of the property that our holographic proof
system is also a locally decodable code. While the relations between PCPs and locally
testable codes have been heavily explored (see e.g. Goldreich’s survey [41]), the con-
nection to locally decodable codes is not as immediate. Nevertheless, related ideas of
Locally Decode/Reject Codes [56] and decodable PCP [38] have been used before in
order to facilitate composition of tests (our holographic proof system, in contrast, is
essentially composition-free). Fortunately, as noted by [38] many constructions of PCPs
are already implicitly locally decodable.
• (Robust everything) Ben-Sasson et al. [20] introduce a notion of robust soundness,
where on an invalid proof, the string read by the verifier must be far from any acceptable
string. (Originally the requirement is far in expectation, but we want far with high
probability.) Another way of looking at the same requirement, is that even if a malicious
prover adaptively changes a small fraction of the bits queried by the verifier, the test
is still sound. In this sense, we require that all our guarantees, not just soundness,
continue to hold (with high probability) even if a malicious entity adaptively changes a
small fraction of the bits queried by the verifier.
How is local proof construction possible? At a high level, our holographic proof system
expects an encoding of u as a low-degree t-variate polynomial, and a few more low-degree
t-variate polynomials, that encode the proof of u ∈ V local. (This is essentially the standard
“arithmetization”, dating back at least to [11, 63], although our construction is most directly
inspired by [59, 65].) In our actual proof, t is a small super-constant, e.g. t ,
√
log n; but for
our exposition here, let us consider t = 2, i.e. we have bivariate polynomials.
The most interesting part of the proof verification is testing that a certain low-degree
polynomial Ψ: G2 → G, for some finite field G of size |G| = Θ (n1/2+o(1)), is identically zero
over all of F2, for some subset F ( G of cardinality |F| = |G| /polylog (n). This can be done
by expecting the prover to provide the following low-degree polynomials:
Ψ′ (x, y) ,
∑
fi∈F
Ψ (x, fi) y
i
Ψ′′ (x, y) ,
∑
fj∈F
Ψ′ (fj , y)xj .
Then, Ψ′′ (x, y) =
∑
fi,fj∈F Ψ (fj , fi)x
jyi is the zero polynomial if and only if Ψ is indeed
identically zero over all of F2. Ψ (x, y) can be computed by accessing E (u) on just a con-
stant number of entries. Thus, computing Ψ′ (x, y) requires Ψ (x, fi) for all fi ∈ F , so a
total of Θ
(
n1/2+o(1)
)
queries to E (u). However, computing even one entry of Ψ′′ (·) requires
Ω (n) queries to E (u). The crucial observation is that we don’t actually need the prover
to provide Ψ′′. Instead, it suffices that the prover provide Ψ′, and the verifier checks that∑
fj∈F Ψ
′ (fj , y)xj = 0 for sufficiently many (x, y).
Putting it all together via polymatrix games
The above arguments suffice to construct a hard Brouwer function (in the sense of Theo-
rem 1.4) that can be computed “n1/2+o(1)-locally”. We formalize this statement in terms of
approximate Nash equilibria in a polymatrix game.
Definition 1.6 (Polymatrix games). In a polymatrix game, each pair of players simultane-
ously plays a separate two-player subgame. Every player has to play the same strategy in
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every two-player subgame, and her utility is the sum of her subgame utilities. The game is
given in the form of the payoff matrix for each two-player subgame.
We construct a bipartite polymatrix game between n1/2+o(1) players with 2n1/2+o(1) actions
each. By “bipartite”, we mean that each player on Alice’s side only interacts with players
on Bob’s side and vice versa. The important term here is “polymatrix”: it means that when
we compute the payoffs in each subgame, they can only depend on the n1/2+o(1) coordinates
described by the two players’ strategies. It is in this sense that we guarantee “local computa-
tion”.
The mixed strategy profile A of all the players on Alice’s side of the bipartite game induces
a vector x(A) ∈ [0, 1]m, for some m = n1+o(1). The mixed strategy profile B of all the players
on Bob’s side induces a vector x(B) ∈ [0, 1]m. Our main technical result is:
Proposition 1.7 (Informal). If all but an -fraction of the players play -optimally, then∥∥x(A) − x(B)∥∥2
2
= O () and
∥∥f (x(A))− x(B)∥∥2
2
= O () .
Each player on Alice’s side corresponds to one of the PCP verifier’s random string. Her
strategy corresponds to an assignment to the bits queried by the verifier given this random
string. On Bob’s side, we consider a partition of {1, . . . ,m} into n1/2+o(1) tuples of n1/2+o(1)
indices each. Each player on Bob’s side assigns values to one such tuple.
On each two-player subgame, the player on Alice’s side is incentivized to imitate the
assignment of the player on Bob’s side on the few coordinates where they intersect. The
player on Bob’s side, uses Alice’s strategy to locally compute fj
(
x(A)
)
on a few j’s in his(
n1/2+o(1)
)
-tuple of coordinates. This computation may be inaccurate, but we can guarantee
that for most coordinates it is approximately correct most of the time.
From polymatrix to bimatrix
The final reduction from the polymatrix game to two-player game follows more or less from
known techniques for hardness of Nash equilibria [4, 32, 15]. We let each of Alice and Bob
control one side of the bipartite polymatrix game. In particular, each strategy in the two-player
game corresponds to picking a player of the polymatrix game, and a strategy for that player.
We add a gadget due to Althofer [4] to guarantee that Alice and Bob mix approximately
uniformly across all their players. See Section 8 for details.
1.2 Results for multiplayer relaxations of Nash equilibrium
Our hardness for norm-2 approximate Brouwer fixed point (Theorem 1.4) has some important
consequences for multiplayer games. All our results in this regime (as well as much of the
existing literature) are inspired by a paper of Babichenko [13] and a blog post of Shmaya [64].
For multiplayer games, there are several interesting questions one can ask. First, note that
the normal form representation of the game is exponential in the number of players, so it is
difficult to talk about computational complexity. To alleviate this, different restricted classes
of multiplayer games have been studied. We have already seen polymatrix games (Definition
1.6), which have a succinct description in terms of the normal forms of the
(
n
2
)
bimatrix
subgames. Another interesting class is graphical games where we are given a (low-degree)
graph over the players, and each player’s utility is only affected by the actions of its neighbors.
The graph of the game constructed in Proposition 1.7 has a high degree, but it is important
that it is bipartite, as are all the games described below. Most generally, we can talk about
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the class of succinct games, which are described via a circuit that computes any entry of the
payoff tensors (this includes polymatrix and graphical games). Finally, there has been recent
significant progress on the query complexity of finding approximate Nash equilibria in arbitrary
n-player games where the payoff tensors are given via a black-box oracle [14, 43, 13, 28].
There are also a few different notions of approximation of Nash equilibrium (all are defined
formally in Subsection 2.2). The strictest notion, -Well-Supported Nash Equilibrium, requires
that for every action in the support of every player, the expected utility, given other players’
mixed strategies, is within (additive)  of the optimal strategy for that player. For this
notion, Babichenko [13] showed a 2Ω(n) lower bound on query complexity for any (possibly
randomized) algorithm. In followup work, [60] showed PPAD-completeness for succinct games,
and soon after [62] extended this PPAD-completeness to games that are both polymatrix
degree-3-graphical.
The most central model in the literature, -Approximate Nash Equilibrium, requires that
every player’s expected utility from her mixed strategy is within  of the optimum she can
achieve (given other players’ strategies). I.e., any player is allowed to assign a small probability
to poor strategies, as long as in expectation she does well. The last PPAD-completeness result
extends immediately to this model (the two notions of approximation are equivalent, up to
constant factors, for constant degree graphical games). For query complexity, Hart and Nisan
[43] and Babichenko [13] asked whether the latter’s exponential lower bound can be extended
to -Approximate Nash Equilibrium. Very recently Chen et al. [28] solved it almost entirely,
showing a lower bound of 2Ω(n/ logn); and they asked whether the Θ (log n) gap in the exponent
can be resolved. Here, we obtain a tight 2Ω(n) lower bound on the query complexity, as well
as stronger inapproximability guarantees.
Finally, the most lenient notion is that of (, δ)-WeakNash: it only requires that a (1− δ)-
fraction of the players play -optimally (“Can almost everybody be almost happy?”). This
notion was recently defined in [15] who conjectured that it is also PPAD-complete for polyma-
trix, graphical games. Their conjecture remains an interesting open problem (see Subsection
1.3). Here, as a consequence of Theorem 1.4, we prove that (, δ)-WeakNash is PPAD-complete
for the more general class of succinct games.
Corollary 1.8. There exist constants , δ > 0, such that finding an (, δ)-WeakNash is PPAD-
hard for succinct multiplayer games where each player has two actions.
Furthermore, as we hinted earlier, our proof also extends to giving truly exponential lower
bounds on the query complexity:
Corollary 1.9. There exist constants , δ > 0, such that any (potentially randomized) algo-
rithm for finding an (, δ)-WeakNash for multiplayer games where each player has two actions
requires 2Ω(n) queries to the players’ payoffs tensors.
1.3 The PCP Conjecture for PPAD
Rather than posing new open problems, let us restate the following conjecture due to [15]:
Conjecture 1.10 (PCP for PPAD; [15]). There exist constants , δ > 0 such that finding an
(, δ)-WeakNash in a bipartite, degree three polymatrix game with two actions per player is
PPAD-complete.
The main original motivation was an approach to prove our main theorem given this
conjecture. As pointed out by [15], it turns out that resolving this conjecture would also have
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interesting consequences for relative approximations of two-player Nash equilibrium, as well
as applications to inapproximability of market equilibrium.
More importantly, this question is interesting in its own right: how far can we extend
the ideas from the PCP Theorem (for NP) to the wold of PPAD? The PCP [r (n) , q (n)]
characterization [8] is mainly concerned with two parameters: r (n), the number of random
bits, and q (n), the number of bits read from the proof. A major tool in all proofs of the PCP
Theorem is verifier composition: in the work of Polishchuk and Spielman [59, 65], for example,
it is first shown that NP ⊆ PCP [O (log n) , n1/2+o(1)], and then via composition it is eventually
obtained that NP = PCP [O (log n) , O (1)]. In some informal sense, one may think of our
main technical result as something analogous5 to PPAD ⊆ PCP [(1/2 + o (1)) log2 n, n1/2+o(1)].
Furthermore, our techniques in Section 6 build on many existing ideas from the PCP literature
[12, 59, 65, 21, 20] that have been used to show similar statements for NP. It is thus natural to
ask: is there a sense in which our “verifier” can be composed? can such composition eventually
resolve the PCP Conjecture for PPAD?
More generally, some of the tools we use here, even as simple as error correcting codes,
have been the basic building blocks in hardness of approximation for decades, yet to the best
of our knowledge have not been used before for any problem in PPAD. We hope to see other
applications of similar ideas in this regime6.
1.4 Additional related work
Aside from [15], previous attempts to show lower bounds for approximate Nash in two player
games have mostly focused on limited models of computation [35] and lower bounding the
support required for obtaining approximate equilibria [4, 39, 6, 5] (in contrast, [54]’s algorithm
runs in quasi-polynomial time because there exist approximate equilibria with support size at
most O
(
logn
2
)
).
Birthday repetition and related quasi-polynomial lower bounds Hazan and
Krauthgamer [44] showed that finding an -Approximate Nash Equilibrium with -optimal
welfare is as hard as the Planted-Clique problem; Austrin et al. [9] later showed that
the optimal-welfare constraint can be replaced by other decision problems. Braverman et al.
[25] recently showed that the hardness Planted-Clique can be replaced by the Exponential
Time Hypothesis, the NP-analog of the ETH for PPAD we use here. The work of Braver-
man et al, together with an earlier paper by Aaronson et al. [1] inspired a line of works on
quasi-polynomial hardness results via the technique of “birthday repetition” [15, 24, 61, 22].
In particular [15] investigated whether birthday repetition can give quasi-polynomial hard-
ness for finding any -Approximate Nash Equilibrium (our main theorem). As we discussed
in Subsection 1.3 the main obstacle is that we don’t have a PPAD-analogue for the PCP
Theorem.
Multiplicative hardness of approximation Daskalakis [31] and our recent work [60] show
that finding an -relative Well-Supported Nash Equilibrium in two-player games is PPAD-hard.
The case of -relative Approximate Nash Equilibrium is still open: our main theorem implies
5We stress that our analogy is very loose. For example, we are not aware of any formal extension of PCP
to function problems, and it is well known that NP ⊆ PCP
[
(1/2 + o (1)) log2 n, n
1/2+o(1)
]
.
6In fact, in the few months since our paper first appeared, our techniques already found applications for
lower bounds on the communication complexity of Nash equilibrium [16].
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that it requires at least quasi-polynomial time, but it is not known whether it is PPAD-hard,
or even if it requires a large support (see also discussion in [15]).
Approximation algorithms The state of the art for games with arbitrary payoffs is ≈
0.339 for two-player games due to Tsaknakis and Spirakis [67] and 0.5+ for polymatrix games
due to Deligkas et al. [37]. For two-player games, PTAS have been given for the special cases
of constant rank games by Kannan and Theobald [48], small-probability games by Daskalakis
and Papadimitriou [35], positive semi-definite games by Alon et al. [3], and sparse games by
Barman [17]. For games with many players and a constant number of strategies, PTAS were
given for the special cases of anonymous games by Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [36] and
polymatrix games on a tree by Barman et al. [18]. Finally, let us return to the more general
class of succinct n-player games, and mention an approximation algorithm due to Goldberg
and Roth [40]; their algorithm runs in exponential time, but uses only a polynomial number
of oracle queries.
Communication complexity The hard instance of Brouwer we construct here (Theorem
1.4) has already been useful in followup work [16], for proving lower bounds on the commu-
nication complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium in N ×N two-player games, as well as
binary-action n-player games.
1.5 Organization
In Section 3, we prove the hardness of finding a 2-norm-approximate Brouwer fixed point
(Theorem 1.4). In Section 4, we use this result to obtain our resutls for many-player games
(Corrolaries 1.8 and 1.9). In Section 5 we introduce the restricted variant LocalEndOfA-
Line and prove that it is also PPAD-complete. In Section 6 we construct our holographic
proof system. In Section 7 we bring together ideas from Sections 3, 5, and 6 to prove our
hardness for polymatrix games of subexponential size. Finally, in Section 8 we reduce from
polymatrix to two-player games.
2 Preliminaries
We use 0n (respectively 1n) to denote the length-n vectors whose value is 0 (1) in every
coordinate.
Small constants
Our proof uses several arbitrary small constants that satisfy:
0 < Precision  Nash  δ  h Complete  Sound  Decode  1.
By  we mean that we pick them such that Precision is arbitrarily smaller than any polyno-
mial in Nash, and Nash is arbitrarily smaller than any polynomial in δ, etc. Although their
significance will be fully understood later in the paper, we briefly mention that Precision
is the precision with which the players can specify real values; Nash is the approximation
factor of Nash equilibrium in Proposition 6.1; δ and h are parameters of the Brouwer func-
tion construction; finally, Complete, Sound, Decode, are parameters of our holographic proof
system.
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Relative norms
Throughout the paper, we use normalized p-norms: for a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn we
define
‖x‖pp , Ei∈[n] [(xi)p] ,
where the expectation over coordinates is taken from uniform distribution, until otherwise
specified.
Similarly, for a binary string pi ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote
|pi| , Ei∈[n] [pii] .
How to catch a far-from-uniform distribution
Lemma 2.1 (Lemma 3 in the full version of [35]). Let {ai}ni=1 be real numbers satisfying the
following properties for some θ > 0: (1) a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an; (2)
∑
ai = 0; (3)
∑n/2
i=1 ai ≤ θ.
Then
∑n
i=1 |ai| ≤ 4θ.
2.1 λ-biased sets
Definition 2.2 (λ-biased sets). Let G be a finite field, and t > 0 an integer. A multiset
S ⊆ Gt is λ-biased if for every nontrivial character χ of Gt,
|Ey∼S [χ (y)]| ≤ λ.
Lemma 2.3 ([10, Theorem 3.2]). A randomly chosen multiset S ⊆ Gt of cardinality
Θ
(
t log |G| /λ2) is λ-biased with high probability.
For many applications, an explicit construction is necessary. In our case, however, we can
enumerate over all sets S of sufficient cardinality in quasi-polynomial time7. The following
Sampling Lemma due to Ben-Sasson et al. [21] allows us to estimate the average of any
function over Gt using only one line and (1 + o (1)) log2
∣∣Gt∣∣ randomness:
Lemma 2.4 (Sampling Lemma: [21, Lemma 4.3]). Let B : Gt → [0, 1]. Then, for any  > 0,
Pr
x∈Gt,
y∈S
[|Eβ∈G [B (x+ βy)]− Ez∈Gt [B (z)]| > ] ≤
(
1
|G| + λ
)
Ez∈Gt [B (z)]
2
.
2.2 Different notions of approximate Nash equilibrium
A mixed strategy of player i is a distribution xi over i’s set of actions, Ai. We say that a
vector of mixed strategies x ∈ ×j∆Aj is a Nash equilibrium if every strategy ai in the support
of every xi is a best response to the actions of the mixed strategies of the rest of the players,
x−i. Formally,
∀ai ∈ supp (xi) Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] = max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i
[
ui
(
a′, a−i
)]
.
7Note that we need an -biased set for a large field G = F2` . Such constructions are not as common in the
literature which mostly focuses on the field F2. To the best of our knowledge, existing explicit constructions
for larger fields require much larger cardinality. Nevertheless, for our modest pseudorandomness desiderata,
we could actually use the explicit construction from [2]. For ease of presentation, we prefer to brute-force
derandomize the construction from [10].
10
Equivalently, x is a Nash equilibrium if each mixed strategy xi is a best response to x−i:
Ea∼x [ui (a)] = max
x′i∈∆Ai
Ea∼(x′i;x−i) [ui (a)] .
Each of those equivalent definitions can be generalized to include approximation in a
different way.
Definition 2.5 (-Approximate Nash Equilibrium). We say that x is an -Approximate Nash
Equilibrium (-ANE) if each xi is an -best response to x−i:
Ea∼x [ui (a)] ≥ max
x
′
i∈∆Ai
E
a∼(x′i;x−i) [ui (a)]− .
On the other hand, we generalize the first definition of Nash equilibrium in the following
stricter definition:
Definition 2.6 (-Well-Supported Nash Equilibrium). x is a -Well-Supported Nash Equilib-
rium (-WSNE) if every ai in the support of xi is an -best response to x−i:
∀ai ∈ supp (xi) Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] ≥ max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i
[
ui
(
a
′
, a−i
)]
− .
WeakNash
We can further relax both of the above definitions by requiring that the corresponding condi-
tion only hold for most of the players (rather than all of them).
Definition 2.7 ((, δ)-WeakNash [15]). We say that x is an (, δ)-WeakNash if for a (1− δ)-
fraction of i’s, xi is an -best mixed response to x−i:
Pr
i
[
Ea∼x [ui (a)] ≥ max
x
′
i∈∆Ai
E
a∼(x′i;x−i) [ui (a)]− 
]
≥ 1− δ.
Definition 2.8 ((, δ)-Well-Supported WeakNash). x is a (, δ)-Well-Supported WeakNash if
for a (1− δ)-fraction of i’s, every ai in the support of xi is an -best response to x−i:
Pr
i
[
∀ai ∈ supp (xi) Ea−i∼x−i [ui (ai, a−i)] ≥ max
a′∈Ai
Ea−i∼x−i
[
ui
(
a
′
, a−i
)]
− 
]
≥ 1− δ.
2.3 Classes of multiplayer games
Definition 2.9 (Polymatrix games). In a polymatrix game, each pair of players simultaneously
plays a separate two-player game, which we call the subgame. Every player has to play the
same strategy in every two-player subgame, and her utility is the sum of her subgame utilities.
In other words, the i-th player utility ui decomposes as
ui (ai, a−i) =
∑
j
vji (ai, aj) .
The game is given in the form of the payoff matrix for each two-player subgame.
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Definition 2.10 (Graphical games). In a graphical game [50], the utility of each player
depends only on the action chosen by a few other players. This game now naturally induces a
directed graph: we say that (i, j) ∈ E if the utility of player j depends on the strategy chosen
by player i. When the maximal incoming degree is bounded, the game has a representation
polynomial in the number of players and strategies.
Definition 2.11 (Succinct games). }
A succinct game has a polynomial (in the number of players and strategies) size circuit
that computes the entries of the payoff tensors. The input to the computational problem of
finding (approximate) Nash equilibria to succinct games is the circuit.
3 2-norm approximate Brouwer fixed point
In this section we obtain a qualitative strengthening of previous hardness of approximation for
Brouwer (Theorem 1.3) where we replace the ∞-norm of the inapproximability with p-norm
for a constant p (in particular, p = 2).
Definition 3.1 (-SuccinctBrouwerp). Given an arithmetic circuit that computes a func-
tion f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n that is 1/-Lipschitz with respect to p-norm, -SuccinctBrouwerp
is the problem of computing an x such that ‖f (x)− x‖p ≤ .
Theorem 3.2. There exist a constant  > 0, such that -SuccinctBrouwer2 is PPAD-hard.
Furthermore, there is a linear time reduction from EndOfALine to -SuccinctBrouwer2.
The proof has two main arguments: in Lemma 3.3 we show how to embed the EndO-
fALine graph as a collection of continuous paths in [−1, 2]O(n); Lemma 3.4 describes how
to embed a continuous Brouwer function whose fixed points correspond to endpoints of the
paths constructed in Lemma 3.3.
3.1 Embedding with an error correcting code
Let m = Θ (n), and let α, η > 0 be some sufficiently small constants. For convenience of
notation we will construct a function f : [−1, 2]3m → [−1, 2]3m (instead of [0, 1]); in particular,
now the vertices of the discrete hypercube {0, 1}3m are interior points of our domain.
Lemma 3.3. We can efficiently embed an EndOfALine graph G over {0, 1}n as a collection
of continuous paths and cycles in [−1, 2]3m, such that the following hold:
• Each edge in G corresponds to a concatenation of a few line segments between vertices
of {0, 1}3m; we henceforth call them Brouwer line segments and Brouwer vertices.
• The points on any two non-consecutive Brouwer line segments are η-far.
• The points on any two consecutive Brouwer line segments are also η-far, except near the
point y ∈ {0, 1}3m where the two Brouwer line segments connect;
• The (unsigned) angle between every two consecutive Brouwer line segments is at least α
(and at most pi/4).
• Given any point x ∈ [−1, 2]3m, we can use the EndOfALine predecessor and succes-
sor circuits to determine in polynomial time whether x is η-close to any Brouwer line
segment, and if so what is the distance to this Brouwer line segment, and what are its
endpoints.
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• There is a one-to-one correspondence between endpoints of the embedded paths and so-
lutions of the EndOfALine instance.
Proof. We think of the 3m coordinates as partitioned into three parts, representing the current
vertex in G, the next vertex in G, and an auxiliary compute-next vs copy bit. Let EC(·) denote
the encoding in a binary, linear error correcting code C with message length n, block length m,
constant relative distance, and an efficient decoding scheme (e.g. [66]). The current and next
vertex are encoded with C, whereas the Compute-vs-Copy bit is encoded with a repetition
code.
For each edge (u→ v) in G, we have Brouwer line segments connecting follow-
ing points (in this order): (EC (u) , EC (u) ,0m), (EC (u) , EC (v) ,0m), (EC (u) , EC (v) ,1m),
(EC (v) , EC (v) ,1m), (EC (v) , EC (v) ,0m). Notice that in each Brouwer line segment, only
one subset of m coordinates change. Thus whenever we are close to a line, we can successfully
decode the 2m fixed coordinates. Once we decode the 2m fixed coordinates, we can compute
what should be the values on the other m coordinates using the EndOfALine predecessor
and successor circuits, and determine the endpoints of the Brouwer line segment, and then
also the distance to it.
Because the code has a constant relative distance, the lower bounds on distances and angles
between Brouwer line segments follow. Finally the angles are at most pi/4 because vertices
of a hypercube cannot form obtuse angles (the dot product of any two vertices of {0, 1}3m is
non-negative).
3.2 Constructing a continuous function
Let m be as before, and let 0 < δ  h < 1 be sufficiently small constants. Theorem 3.2
follows from the next lemma by setting f (x) , x+ g (x).
Lemma 3.4. We can efficiently embed an EndOfALine graph G over {0, 1}n as a displace-
ment function g : [−1, 2]4m → [−δ, δ]4m such that:
1. g (·) does not send any point outside the hypercube, i.e. x+ g (x) ∈ [−1, 2]4m.
2. g (·) is O (1)-Lipschitz (thus, f (·) is also O (1)-Lipschitz).
3. ‖g (x)‖2 = Ω (δ) for every x that does not correspond to an endpoint of a path.
4. The value of g at any point x whose first 3m coordinates are 2
√
h-close to a Brouwer line
segment (resp. two consecutive Brouwer line segments) from the embedding in Lemma
3.3, depends only on its location relative to the endpoints of the Brouwer line segment(s).
5. The value of g at any point x whose first 3m coordinates are 2
√
h-far from all Brouwer
line segments from Lemma 3.3, does not depend on the graph G.
Proof. We think of the 4m coordinates as partitioned into four parts: the first three are used
as in Lemma 3.3 (current, next, and compute-vs-copy), and the last m coordinates represent
a special default direction in which the displacement points when far from all Brouwer line
segments (similarly to the single special coordinate in [45]).
We consider a path starting at (03m, 2 · 1m), i.e. the concatenation of 0 on the first 3m
coordinates, and 2 on the last m coordinates. The path first goes to 04m (in a straight line),
and thereafter the lastm coordinates remain constant (0), while the first 3m coordinates follow
the path from Lemma 3.3. We say that a point x is in the picture if Ei∈{3m+1,...,4m}xi < 1/2.
We construct g separately inside and outside the picture (and make sure that the construction
agrees on the hyperplane Ei∈{3m+1,...,4m}xi = 1/2).
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Truncation In order for g (·) to be a displacement function, we must ensure that it never
sends any points outside the hypercube, i.e. ∀x ∈ [−1, 2]4m, we require that also x + g (x) ∈
[−1, 2]4m. Below, it is convenient to first define an untruncated displacement function gˆ :
[−1, 2]4m → [−δ, δ]4m which is not restricted by the above condition. We then truncate
each coordinate to fit in [−1, 2]: [g (x)]i = max {−1,min {2, xi + [gˆ (x)]i}} − xi. It is clear
that the truncation is easy to compute and if gˆ (·) is (M − 1)-Lipschitz, then g (·) is M -
Lipschitz. It is, however, important to make sure that the the magnitude of the displacement
is not compromised. Typically, some of the coordinates may need to be truncated, but we
design the displacement so that most coordinates, say 99%, are not truncated. If gˆ (x) has
a non-negligible component in at least 5% of the coordinates, then in total g (x) maintains a
non-negligible magnitude.
Inside the picture
We have to define the displacement for x far from every line, for x near one line, and for x near
two consecutive lines (notice that by Lemma 3.3 no point is close to two non-consecutive lines).
For x far from every line, we use the default displacement, which points in the positive special
direction: gˆ (x) = (03m, δ · 1m). Because x is inside the picture, the truncated displacement
g (x) is close to gˆ (x), and therefore satisfies ‖g (x)‖2 = Ω (δ).
For x which is close to one line, we construct the displacement as follows: on the line, the
displacement points in the direction of the path; at distance h from the line, the displacement
points in towards the line; at distance 2h from the line, the displacement points against the
direction of the path; at distance 3h, the displacement points in the default direction.
Formally, let β(s→t) (x) denote the magnitude of the component of x − s in the direction
of line (s→ t),
β(s→t) (x) ,
(t− s)
‖s− t‖2
· (x− s) ,
where · denotes the (in-expectation) dot product. Let z = z (x) be the point nearest to x on
the line; notice that z satisfies
z = β(s→t) (x) t+
(
1− β(s→t) (x)
)
s.
For points near the line (‖x− z‖2 ≤ 3h), but far from its endpoints (β(s→t) (x) ∈[√
h, 1−√h
]
), we define the displacement:
gˆ (x) ,

δ (t−s)‖t−s‖2 ‖x− z‖2 = 0
δ (z−x)h ‖x− z‖2 = h
δ (s−t)‖t−s‖2 ‖x− z‖2 = 2h
δ (03m,1m) ‖x− z‖2 = 3h
(1)
At intermediate distances from the line, we interpolate: at distance ‖x− z‖2 = 13h, for
example, we have gˆ (x) = 23δ
(t−s)
‖t−s‖2 +
1
3δ
(z−x)
h . Notice that every two of (t− s), (z− x), and
(03m,1m) are orthogonal, so the interpolation does not lead to cancellation. Also, every point
z on the line is Ω (1)-far in every coordinate from {−1, 2}, so the truncated displacement g (x)
still satisfies ‖g (x)‖2 = Ω (δ). For each case in (1), gˆ (·) is either constant, or (in the case
of ‖x− z‖2 = h) O (δ/h)-Lipschitz; by choice of δ  h, it follows that gˆ (·) is in particular
O (1)-Lipschitz. Furthermore, notice that ‖x− z‖2 is 1-Lipschitz, so after interpolating for
14
intermediate distances, gˆ (·) continues to be O (1)-Lipschitz. Notice also that at distance 3h
the displacement defined in (1) agrees with the displacements for points far from every line,
so Lipschitz continuity is preserved.
Close to a vertex
At distance O
(√
h
)
from a Brouwer vertex (recall
√
h h), we use a different displacement
that interpolates between the incoming and outgoing Brouwer line segments. Consider x
which is close to the line from s to y, and also to the line from y to t. Notice that every two
consecutive Brouwer line segments change disjoint subsets of the coordinates, so (s→ y) and
(y→ t) are orthogonal. Let z(s→y) be the point on line (s→ y) that is at distance
√
h from
y; similarly, let z(y→t) be the point on line (y→ t) that is at distance
√
h from y.
The high level idea is to “cut the corner” and drive the flow along the line segment Ly that
connects z(s→y) and z(y→t). In particular, we consider points x that are within distance 3h
of Ly. For all points further away (including y itself), we use the default displacement.
Our goal is to interpolate between the line displacement for (s→ y) (which is defined up to
β(s→y) (x) = 1−
√
h), and the line displacement for (y→ t) (which begins at β(y→t) (x) =
√
h).
Let ∆(s→y) (x) , β(s→y) (x) −
(
1−√h
)
, and ∆(y→t) (x) ,
√
h − β(y→t) (x). We set our
interpolation parameter α = α (x) , ∆(y→t)(x)∆(y→t)(x)+∆(s→y)(x) , and set
z , αz(s→y) + (1− α) z(y→t). (2)
For points x near y such that ∆(s→y) (x) ,∆(y→t) (x) ≥ 0, we can now define the displace-
ment analogously to (1):
gˆ (x) ,

δ ·
[
α (y−s)‖y−s‖2 + (1− α)
(t−y)
‖t−y‖2
]
‖x− z‖2 = 0
δ (z−x)h ‖x− z‖2 = h
δ ·
[
α (s−y)‖y−s‖2 + (1− α)
(y−t)
‖t−y‖2
]
‖x− z‖2 = 2h
δ (03m,1m) ‖x− z‖2 ≥ 3h
. (3)
At intermediate distances, interpolate according to ‖x− z‖2. Notice that for each fixed choice
of α ∈ [0, 1] (and z), gˆ is O (δ/h) = O (1)-Lipschitz. Furthermore, ∆(s→y) and ∆(y→t) are
1-Lipschitz in x. For any z ∈ Ly, ∆(y→t) (z) + ∆(s→y) (z) =
√
h. For general x, we have
∆(y→t) (x) + ∆(s→y) (x) ≥ ∆(y→t) (z) + ∆(s→y) (z)− 2 ‖x− z‖2 =
√
h− 2 ‖x− z‖2 ; (4)
so α is O
(
1/
√
h
)
-Lipschitz whenever ‖x− z‖2 < 3h, and otherwise has no effect on gˆ (x).
We conclude that gˆ is still O (1)-Lipschitz when interpolating across different values of α.
At the interface with (1), α is 1 (0 near z(y→t)), so (1) and (3) are equal. Therefore gˆ is
O (1)-Lipschitz on all of [−1, 2]4m.
To lower bound the magnitude of the displacement, we argue that (z− x) is orthogonal to[
α (y−s)‖y−s‖2 + (1− α)
(t−y)
‖t−y‖2
]
. First, observe that we can restrict our attention to the component
of (z− x) that belongs to the plane defined by s,y, t (in which z also lies). Let Ps,y,t (x)
denote the projection of x to this plain. We can write points in this plane in terms of their
∆ (·) , (∆(s→y) (·) ,∆(y→t) (·)) values. (Recall that (s→ y) and (y→ t) are orthogonal.)
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First, observe that ∆
(
z(s→y)
)
=
(
0,
√
h
)
, ∆
(
z(y→t)
)
=
(√
h, 0
)
and ∆ (y) =
(√
h,
√
h
)
.
Notice also that[
α
(y − s)
‖y − s‖2
+ (1− α) (t− y)‖t− y‖2
]
=
[
α
(
y − z(s→y)
)
√
h
+ (1− α)
(
z(y→t) − y
)
√
h
]
.
Putting those together, we have that
∆
([
α
y
‖y − s‖2
+ (1− α) t‖t− y‖2
])
−∆
([
α
s
‖y − s‖2
+ (1− α) y‖t− y‖2
])
= (α, 1− α) .
(5)
For z, we have
∆ (z) = α∆
(
z(s→y)
)
+ (1− α) ∆ (z(y→t)) = √h (1− α, α) .
Finally, for Ps,y,t (x), we can write
∆ (Ps,y,t (x)) =
(
∆(y→t) (x) ,∆(s→y) (x)
)
=
1
∆(y→t) (x) + ∆(s→y) (x)
(1− α, α) .
Therefore ∆ (z)−∆ (Ps,y,t (x)) is orthogonal to (5).
Outside the picture
The displacement outside the picture is constructed by interpolating the displacement at
Ei∈{3m+1,...,4m}xi = 1/2, and the displacement at points in the “top” of the hypercube,
where xi = 2 for every i in the last m coordinates. The former displacement, where
Ei∈{3m+1,...,4m}xi = 1/2 is defined to match the displacement inside the picture. Namely,
it is the default displacement everywhere except near the first Brouwer line segment which
goes “down” from s = (03m, 2 · 1m) to t = (04m). Near this line, it is defined according to (1).
(Notice that ‖t− s‖2 = 1.)
Formally, let z1/2 =
(
03m,
1
2 · 1m
)
; for x on the boundary of the picture, we have:
gˆ (x) ,

δ (03m,−1m)
∥∥x− z1/2∥∥2 = 0
δ
(z1/2−x)
h
∥∥x− z1/2∥∥2 = h
δ (03m,1m)
∥∥x− z1/2∥∥2 ≥ 2h
(6)
For points x such that Ei∈{3m+1,...,4m}xi is very close to 2, the displacement δ (03m,1m) is not
helpful because it points outside the hypercube, i.e. it would get completely erased by the
truncation. Instead, we define the displacement as follows:
gˆ (x) ,
{
δ (03m,−1m) ‖x− z2‖2 = 0
δ (z1−x)h ‖x− z2‖2 ≥ h,
(7)
where z2 = (03m, 2 · 1m). When θ , Ei∈{3m+1,...,4m}xi ∈ (1/2, 2), we interpolate between (6)
and (7) according to θ−1/23/2 .
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Figure 1: Geometry near a Brouwer vertex
s
z(s→y)
y z(y→t) t
x
z
The figure (not drawn to scale) shows some of the important points near a Brouwer vertex y:
There is an incoming Brouwer line segment from s through z(s→y), and an outgoing Brouwer
line segment to t through z(y→t). For each point x between the dashed lines, we assign a
point z on the line Ly as in (2), and define the displacement according to (3). Outside the
dashed lines (including at y itself), we use the default displacement δ (03m,1m).
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3.3 Locally computing the Brouwer function
In the Brouwer function above, to compute all of f (x) exactly, we essentially need to know
x in every coordinate. However, in order to compute fi (x) (the i-th coordinate of f (x)), it
suffices to know xi and that x is:
• inside the picture, but far from every line;
• close to some point z on line (s→ t) (but far from s and t),
– also need to know si, ti, zi, ‖x− z‖2 and ‖t− s‖2;
• close to some point z on line Ly for vertex y on the intersection of lines (s→ y) and
(y→ t),
– also need to know si, yi, ti, zi, ‖x− z‖2 , ‖y − s‖2 , ‖t− y‖2, and α; or
• outside the picture,
– also need to know Ei∈{3m+1,...,4m}xi and ‖x− z‖2, where z is the(
Ei∈{3m+1,...,4m}xi
)
-weighted average of z1/2 and z2.
By Lipschitz continuity, if we only want to compute fi (x) to within ±, it suffices to know
all the quantities above to within ±. Furthermore, at distance ± near interfaces between
the different cases (inside/outside the picture, close to 0/1/2 lines), we can use the wrong
displacement, and still be within ± of fi (x).
4 Multiplayer games
In this section we establish hardness results for multiplayer games. We first show PPAD-
hardness of (, δ)-WeakNash in multiplayer games where each player has a large constant
number of actions. This is superseded by Corollary 4.2, which proves the same for games
where each player has only two actions. Nevertheless, we begin with the proof of the weaker
Corollary 4.1, as it is the simplest working example of the imitation gadget argument used
both in Corollary 4.2, and in the proof our main theorem (in particular, the construction in
Section 7). All the PPAD-hardness results in this section have query complexity hardness
analogues, as described in Subsection 4.2.
Corollary 4.1. There exist constants , δ > 0, such that finding an (, δ)-WeakNash is PPAD-
hard for succinct multiplayer games where each player has a constant number of actions.
Proof. Let f be the hard function guaranteed by Theorem 3.2. We construct a game with
two groups of n players each. The action set of each player corresponds to {0, 1/k, 2/k . . . , 1}
for a sufficiently large constant k > 0. We denote the choice of strategies for the first group
a , (a1 . . . an), and b , (b1, . . . bn) for the second group.
Each player (A, i) in the first group attempts to imitate the behavior of the corresponding
player in the second group. Her utility is given by
ui (ai, bi) , − |ai − bi|2 .
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The second group players attempt to imitate the value of f , when applied to the vector of
actions taken by all the players in the first group. The utility of the j-th player, (B, j), is
vj (bj ,a) , − |fj (a)− bj |2 ,
where fj denotes the j-th output of f .
Observe that the expected utility for (A, i) is given by:
E [ui (ai, bi)] = − |ai − E (bi)|2 −Var (bi) .
For any value of E (bi), player (A, i) has an action αi ∈ [E (bi)− 1/2k,E (bi) + 1/2k]. Her
utility when playing αi is lower bounded by:
E [ui (αi, bi)] ≥ − 1
4k2
−Var (bi) .
On the other hand, for any âi /∈ {αi, αi + 1/k},
E [ui (âi, bi)] ≤ − 1
k2
−Var (bi) .
Therefore in every
(
δ, δ/k2
)
-WeakNash, it holds for all but a 2δ-fraction of i’s, that player
(A, i) assigns probability at least (1−O (δ)) to strategies {αi, αi + 1/k}. In particular, with
high probability over the randomness of the players, it holds that all but an O (δ)-fraction of
the players play one of those strategies. Therefore with high probability
‖a− E (b)‖2 = O
(√
δ + 1/k
)
. (8)
Similarly, player (B, j) (the j-th player in the second group) has an action βj ∈
[E (fj (a))− 1/2k,E (fj (a)) + 1/2k]. Therefore in every
(
δ, δ/k2
)
-WeakNash, it holds for all
but a 2δ-fraction of j’s, that player (B, j) assigns probability at least (1−O (δ)) to strategies
{βj , βj + 1/k}. In particular, with high probability over the randomness of the players, it
holds that all but an O (δ)-fraction of the players play one of those strategies. Therefore with
high probability
‖b− E (f (a))‖2 = O
(√
δ + 1/k
)
.
Now, by the Lipschitz condition on f , whenever (8) holds,
‖f (a)− f (E (b))‖2 = O
(√
δ + 1/k
)
.
Therefore E (a) and E (b) are both solutions to the Θ
(√
δ + 1/k
)
-SuccinctBrouwer2 in-
stance.
4.1 Binary actions
Corollary 4.2. There exist constants , δ > 0, such that finding an (, δ)-WeakNash is PPAD-
hard for succinct multiplayer games where each player has two actions.
Proof. We replace each player (A, i) (respectively, (B, j)) in the proof of Corollary 4.1 with
k + 1 players, denoted: (A, i, 0) , (A, i, 1/k) , . . . , (A, i, 1). Each new player has two actions:
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{+,−}. Given a (k + 1)-tuple of actions for players {(A, i, ·)}, we define the realized value
ri ∈ [0, 1] to be
ri , max {x s.t. (A, i, x) plays action +} .
Let the realized value qj for players (B, j, 0) , . . . , (B, j, 1) be defined analogously.
We let player (A, i, x)’s utility be:
ui,x (+,b) , −
∣∣∣∣(x+ 1k
)
− qi
∣∣∣∣2
ui,x (−,b) , −
∣∣∣∣(x− 1k
)
− qi
∣∣∣∣2 .
Similarly, for player (B, j, y), we have
uj,y (±,a) , −
∣∣∣∣(y ± 1k
)
− fi (r)
∣∣∣∣2 ,
where r , (r1, . . . , rn) is the vector of realized values on the first group.
For any (A, i, x), we have
E [(ui,x (±,b))] = −
∣∣∣∣(x± 1k
)
− E [qi]
∣∣∣∣2 −Var [qi] .
Subtracting her two possible payoffs, we have
E [(ui,x (+,b))− (ui,x (−,b))] =
∣∣∣∣(x− E [qi])− 1k
∣∣∣∣2 − ∣∣∣∣(x− E [qi]) + 1k
∣∣∣∣2
= −4
k
(x− E [qi]) .
In particular, if E [qi] > x+ k
√
, player (A, i, x) must assign probability at most
√
 to action
{−} in order to play -optimally. For any i such that all players (A, i, ·) use -optimal mixed
strategies, we have that
|E [qi]− E [ri]| = O
(
k
√
+ 1/k
)
. (9)
In any (, δ)-WeakNash, for all but a 2δk-fraction of i’s it holds that all players (A, i, ·)
use -optimal mixed strategies; thus (9) holds for all but a 2δk-fraction of i’s. Therefore,
‖E [q]− E [r]‖2 = O
(√
δk + k
√
+ 1/k
)
.
By the Lipschitz condition on f , the latter also implies,
‖f (E [q])− f (E [r])‖2 = O
(√
δk + k
√
+ 1/k
)
.
Similarly, for every j such that all players (B, j, ·) use -optimal mixed strategies, we have
that
|E [qj ]− fj (E [r])| = O
(
k
√
+ 1/k
)
.
Thus in any (, δ)-WeakNash,
‖E [q]− f (E [r])‖2 = O
(√
δk + k
√
+ 1/k
)
.
Therefore E (q) and E (r) are both solutions to the Θ
(√
δk + k
√
+ 1/k
)
-
SuccinctBrouwer2 instance.
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4.2 Query complexity
Notice that the proofs of Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 4.2 access the successor and predecessor
circuits as black box. In particular, we can replace the circuits with access to a black box
oracle, and ask how many oracle queries are necessary to compute an approximate Brouwer
fixed point or an (, δ)-WeakNash. The reductions in Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 4.2 imply
that both require at least as many queries as solving the EndOfALine instance with oracle
access to the successor and predecessor functions: 2Ω(n) queries (e.g. [13, Proposition 4]).
We therefore have the following corollaries.
Definition 4.3 (-OracleBrouwerp). Given black-box oracle access to a function
f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n that is 1/-Lipschitz with respect to p-norm, -OracleBrouwerp is
the problem of computing an x such that ‖f (x)− x‖p ≤ .
Corollary 4.4. There exist a constant  > 0, such that any (potentially randomized) algorithm
for -OracleBrouwer2 requires 2Ω(n) queries.
Corollary 4.5. There exist constants , δ > 0, such that any (potentially randomized) algo-
rithm for finding an (, δ)-WeakNash for multiplayer games where each player has two actions
requires 2Ω(n) queries to the players’ payoffs tensors.
5 EndOfALine with local computation
In this section we introduce a local variant of EndOfALine with very simple successor and
predecessor circuits.
Definition 5.1 (LocalEndOfALine). The problem LocalEndOfALine is similar to
EndOfALine, but the graph is defined on a subset V local ⊆ {0, 1}n. The input consists of
a membership circuit MV local : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that determines whether a string u ∈ {0, 1}n
corresponds to a vertex of the graph (i.e. MV local (u) =
{
1 u ∈ V local
0 u /∈ V local ), a special vertex
u0 ∈ V local, and successor and predecessor circuits Slocal, P local : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n with
the promise that every output bit depends only on a constant number of input bits. (I.e.
Slocal and P local are in NC0.) Furthermore, we require that the outputs of Slocal and
P local are identical to the respective inputs, except at a constant number of coordinates.
Similarly to EndOfALine, we are guaranteed that P local (u0) = u0 6= Slocal (u0).
The goal is to find an input u ∈ V local that satisfies any of the following:
• End-of-a-line: P local (Slocal (u)) 6= u or Slocal (P local (u)) 6= u 6= u0; or
• Boundary conditions: Slocal (u) /∈ V local or P local (u) /∈ V local.
Notice that each vertex u ∈ V local, only defers from Slocal (u) and P local (u) at a
constant number of bits, and the value of each of those only depends on a constant number of
bits of u. We will refer to all those bits as the criticial bits of u, and denote their cardinality
qcritical.
We now reduce EndOfALine to LocalEndOfALine, proving that the latter is PPAD-
complete. In the following sections we use this reduction “white-box”, and revisit some of its
specific properties.
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Theorem 5.2. There is a linear-time reduction from EndOfALine to LocalEndOfALine.
Notice that there is a trivial reduction in the other direction: add self-loops to all strings
not in V local.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Given circuits S, P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, we construct new circuits
Slocal, P local : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m that satisfy Definition 5.1. We assume wlog that the cir-
cuits have fan-out 2 (otherwise, replace gates with larger fan-outs with a binary tree of equality
gates; this only blows up the size of the circuit by a constant factor). We setm = 4 (|S|+ |P |),
where by |S| and |P | we mean the number of lines (i.e. number of inputs + number of logic
gates) in each circuit, respectively. We think of the m bits as representing two copies of each
circuit (S1, P1 and S2, P2), with each line represented by two bits, representing three possible
states: value 0, value 1, and inactive.
The path begins with circuit S1 containing the computation from 0n to S (0n), and circuit
P1 containing the reverse computation back to 0n; the lines of circuits S2, P2 are inactive.
This is the special vertex, u0.
Over the next n steps, the output bits of S1 are copied (one-by-one) to the input bits of
S2 (and the corresponding lines are activated). Over the next |S| − n steps, the values on the
lines of S2 are updated -one-by-one, starting from the inputs and propagating to the outputs
in a fixed order- until all the output bits are activated and set to S (S (0n)). Then, over
the next |P | steps, the input of P2 is set to S (S (0n)), the values on the gates are updated
(propagating in a fixed order from output to input), and finally setting the output of P2 to
S (0n).
Notice that so far, if we want to trace back a step (a.k.a. implement P local), we simply
need to deactivate the last activated line. We now start erasing values when going forward, but
we must do so carefully so that we can reconstruct them when going backward. We proceed
by deactivating the lines in S1: line by line, in reverse order from outputs to inputs. Indeed,
in order to go back we can reconstruct the output of any gate from its inputs. If we want to
reconstruct an input to S1 - this is no problem as it is saved as the output of P1. Once we
finish deactivating S1, we deactivate P1, also in reverse order. Notice again that the input to
P1 is saved as the input to S2 and output of P2. Now, we copy the values from S2 and P2 to
S1 and P1 in the same order that we used to deactivate the lines, starting from the outputs of
S1, to inputs, to outputs of P1, to inputs. Then we deactivate the lines in S2 and P2; again,
we use the same order in which they were activated, starting from inputs of S2, to outputs,
to inputs of P2, to outputs. So now we have S1 as a witness to the computation of S (S (0n))
from S (0n) and P1 goes in the reverse order, while all the lines of S2 and P2 are inactive.
We repeat the process from the last two paragraphs to find S (S (S (0n))), etc.
We let V local to be the set of strings that correspond to a legal partial computation as
described above. MV local verifies that a string corresponds to one of the following scenarios:
• S1 holding the computation from some x ∈ {0, 1}n to S (x), P1 holding the computation
from S (x) back to x, and S2 and P2 holding part of the computation from S (x) to
S (S (x)) and back to S (x);
• S2 and P2 holding the computation from some x to S (x) and back to x, and P1 and S1
are in the process of erasing the computation from x to P (x) and back to x;
• S2 and P2 holding the computation from some x to S (x) and back to x, and S1 and P1
are in the process of copying it; or
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• S1 and P1 holding the computation from some x to S (x) and back to x, are S2 and P2
in the process of erasing the same computation.
Notice that the joint active/inactive state of all the lines always belongs to one of O (m) dif-
ferent states (that can be described by log2m+O (1) bits. Verifying that a string corresponds
to one of the above scenarios is equivalent to checking that the joint active/inactive state is
valid, and that the values on all the lines satisfy all of the following local conditions:
• The i-th input of S1 is either inactive, equal to the i-th output of P1, or, if the latter is
inactive (during the copy phase), equal to the i-th input of S2.
• The i-th input of P1 is either inactive, equal to the i-th output of S1, or, if the latter is
inactive (during the erase phase), equal to the i-th input of S2.
• The output of every gate in S1, P1 is either inactive, equal to the gate applied to its
inputs, or, if either of the inputs is inactive (during the copy phase), equal to the
respective line in S2, P2.
• The i-th input of S2 is either inactive, equal to the i-th output of P2, or, if the latter is
inactive (during the compute phase), equal to the i-th input of P2.
• The i-th input of P2 is either inactive, equal to the i-th output of S2, or, if the latter is
inactive (during the erase phase), equal to the i-th input of P1.
• The output of every gate in S2, P2 is either inactive, equal to the gate applied to its
inputs, or, if either of the inputs is inactive (during the erase phase), equal to the
respective line in S1, P1.
Notice that each line participates in at most three local constraints. Note also that each of
those conditions only depends on a constant number of bits so MV local , which simply needs
to compute their AND, is in AC0 (this proves Theorem 1.5).
In every step a line is either activated or deactivated, so there are no fixed points; but
fixed points of the original circuit lead to violations of the form P local (Slocal (u)) 6= u and
Slocal (P local (u)) 6= u 6= u0. In particular, every solution to the new LocalEndOfALine
instance corresponds to a valid solution to the original EndOfALine instance.
Also, notice that in every step we change at most two bits (and at least one), and deciding
the next value of each bit can be done by looking only at a constant number of bits (conditioned
on being a legal vertex in V local): which is the next line to be activated/deactivated? if
activated, what are the inputs to the corresponding gate?
5.1 The LocalEndOfALine counter
Consider the instance produced in the reduction above. Notice that joint active/inactive
state of all the lines rotates among O (m) possible vectors. I.e. there is a (logm+O (1))-bit
vector, henceforth called the counter which describes precisely which lines should be active.
Furthermore, given the counter of some u ∈ V local, it is easy to compute the counter of
Slocal (u) , i.e. we always know which line should be activated/deactivated next - regardless
of the values on the lines. Similarly, for all u 6= u0 ∈ V local, it is also easy to compute the
counter of P local (u). An additional useful property is that given the counter of u, we also
know the coordinates of the critical bits of u.
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6 Holographic Proof
In this section we construct our holographic proof system for statements of the form u ∈
V local. Note that we use the term “verifier” loosely, as our verifier’s responsibilities extend
far beyond checking the validity of a proof - it is also expected to perform local decoding,
“local proof construction”, etc.
Proposition 6.1. For sufficiently small constants Decode  Sound  Complete > 0, the
following holds. Fix any instance (Slocal, P local, V local) of LocalEndOfALine, generated
via the reduction in Section 5 from an instance (S, P ) EndOfALine. Given a vertex u ∈
V local, there is a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that takes as input (S, P ) and u,
and outputs a holographic proof Π (u) = (E (u) , C (u) , pi (u)) where:
• E (u) is an encoding of u with a linear error correcting code of constant relative dis-
tance.
• C (u) is an encoding of the counter of u (with a good error correcting code).
• pi (u) is a proof that u ∈ V local.
• Let n , |u|; then the total length of Π (u) is n1+o(1).
• Let t , √log n (in particular, t = ω (1), but also t = o
(
logn
log logn
)
). Let G be a finite field
of size O
(
n1/t+o(1)
)
. E (u) and pi (u) can be written as functions over domain Gt. In
particular, we can talk about accessing E (u), pi (u), or Π (u) at a point g ∈ Gt. (C (u)
is much shorter and the verifier reads it entirely.)
• There is a quasi-polynomial8 time probabilistic verifier such that:
– (Local access) The verifier’s access to Π (u) is restricted as follows:
∗ (Querying subspaces) The verifier reads no(1) axis-parallel (t/2)-dimensional
subspaces of Π (u). Each subspace is defined by a restriction of a (t/2)-tuple of
coordinates. The tuple of coordinates which is restricted is always one of a con-
stant number of possibilities (either {2, . . . , t/2 + 1}, or the union of any two of:
{1, . . . , t/4}, {t/4 + 1, . . . , t/2}, {t/2 + 1, . . . , 3t/4}, and {3t/4 + 1, . . . , t}).
We denote the union of all the subspaces read by the verifier GAll. It will
be useful to decompose GAll = GPCP ∪ GLTC ∪ Gcritical; another subset of
interest is GSample ⊂ GPCP.
∗ (Partially adaptive) GSample, GPCP, GLTC are chosen non-adaptively, i.e.
they depend only on the verifier’s internal randomness. Gcritical is a union
of affine translations of a subspace that is also chosen non-adaptively, but the
affine translations depend on C (u).
∗ (Randomness) The verifier uses only (1/2 + o (1)) log2 n bits of randomness
to decide which subspaces to query.
8The verifier of our holographic proof actually runs in polynomial time, except for the derandomization of
the construction of λ-biased sets. As we discuss in Section 2.1 this could also be obtained (with slightly worse
parameters) in deterministic polynomial time, but quasi-polynomial time suffices for the purpose of our main
theorem.
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∗ (Good Sample) For any function B : Gt → [0, 1], and any G ∈
{GSample, GPCP, GLTC, Gcritical}, with probability 1− o (1) over the verifier’s
randomness,
|Eg∈G [B (g)]− Eh∈Gt [B (h)]| = o (1) .
– (Soundness) If the verifier is given a string Π′ which is Sound-far from Π (u) for
every u ∈ V local, the verifier rejects with probability 1− o (1).
∗ (Robust soundness) Furthermore, with probability 1− o (1), the bits read by
the verifier are 2Sound-far from any string that would make the verifier accept.
In other words, the verifier continues to reject with probability 1−o (1) even in
the presence of an adaptive adversary, who observes the queries made by the
verifier, and then corrupts an 2Sound/2-fraction of each of GPCP, GLTC.
– (Completeness) If the verifier is given access to a string Π̂ that is Complete-
close to a valid Π (u) for some u ∈ V local, then the verifier accepts with probability
1− o (1).
∗ (Robust completeness) Furthermore, the verifier continues to accept with
probability at least 1− o (1) even in the presence of an adaptive adversary, who
observes the queries made by the verifier, and then corrupts a
√
Complete-
fraction of GPCP, GLTC.
– (Decoding) If the verifier is given access to a string Π̂ that is Decode-close to a
valid Π (u) for some u ∈ V local:
∗ (Error-correction on a sample) With probability at least 1− o (1), the ver-
ifier correctly decodes the entries of E (u) and pi (u) on GSample. In particular,
with probability 1− o (1), the verifier can estimate the distance between Π̂ and
Π (u) to within an additive error of ±o (1).
∗ (Error-correction on the critical bits) The verifier can adaptively decode
and correct any qcritical-tuple of symbols from the proof with success probability
at least 1 − o (1). Let Gcritical ⊂ Gt denote the union of all O
(
|G|2
)
axis-
parallel subspaces queried in this process.
∗ (Proof-construction) Given access as above to the counter C (u) and the
linear code E (u) (but not to the proof pi (u)), the verifier can output (with
probability at least 1− o (1)) the correct values of pi (u) on GSample.
∗ (Robust decoding) Both types of error-correction and the proof-construction
continue to hold even in the presence of an adaptive adversary, who observes
the queries made by the verifier, and then corrupts a
√
Decode-fraction of each
of GSample, GPCP, GLTC, Gcritical.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 6.1.
6.1 From LocalEndOfALine to coloring graphs
Let t ,
√
log n. Set ` , log2 nt−1 = Θ
(√
log n
)
, and `′ , `+ c log log n for some sufficiently large
constant c. Let p (z) be an F2-irreducible polynomial of degree `′, and let G , F2 [z] / 〈p (z)〉
denote the field of size 2`′ . We will focus our attention on a subset F ⊂ G of polynomials
(modulo p (z)) of degree `; notice that |G| / |F| = poly log n.
Let α be a generator of G, and let E = {1, α, . . . , α5t`}. We define the Extended
Shuffle-F-Exchange graph on F t−1 × E to be the directed graph such that each vertex
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(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αi
) ∈ F t−1 × (E \ {α5t`}), has a static edge to vertex (x1, . . . , xt−1, αi+1), a
shuffle edge to vertex
(
x2, . . . , xt−1, x1, αi+1
)
, and ` exchange edges to all vertices of the
form
(
x1 +
[
zj
]
, . . . , xt−1, αi+1
)
, for every j ∈ {0, . . . , `− 1}. Here [zj] is the element of
G representing the equivalence class {zj + q (z) p (z) : q (z) ∈ F2 [z]}. Notice that x ∈ F iff it
can be written as x =
∑
j∈S
[
zj
]
for some subset S ⊆ {0, . . . , `− 1}. In particular, for any
(x1, . . . , xt−1) , (y1, . . . , yt−1) ∈ F t−1, the Extended Shuffle-F-Exchange graph contains a path
of length (t− 1) (`+ 1) from (x1, . . . , xt−1, 1) to
(
y1, . . . , yt−1, α(t−1)(`+1)
)
.
For each αi ∈ E , we call the set of vertices {(x1, . . . , xt−1, αi)} a layer; in particular,
{(x1, . . . , xt−1, 1)} form the first layer, and
{(
x1, . . . , xt−1, α5t`
)}
form the last layer.
We encode each vertex u ∈ V local as a partial coloring of the Extended Shuffle-F-
Exchange graph, representing the assignments to the lines in the four circuits S1, P1, S2, P2.
Recall that |F| = 2` = n1/(t−1). We associate each line of S1, P1, S2, P2 (including input, gates,
and output lines) with a vector x ∈ F t−1 arbitrarily. For the first- and last-layer vertices (x, 1)
and
(
x, α5t`
)
, we assign colors that represent the assignments (from {0, 1,⊥}, where ⊥ repre-
sents an inactive line) to the corresponding line. Recall from the “local conditions” in Section
5 that every line only participates in three constraints.
We would like the inputs to the line in
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, α5t`
)
to be propagated by the Ex-
tended Shuffle-F-Exchange graph from the first layer. One important feature of the Extended
Shuffle-F-Exchange graph is that we can do exactly that: By using standard packet-routing
techniques, we can route the assignments from the first layer to the last layer so that every
vertex on the way needs to remember at most three assignments [52, Theorem 3.16]. Fix one
such routing. Our coloring now assigns the same color from {0, 1,⊥} × {⊥}2 to each of the
corresponding vertices on the first and last layers, and propagates this assignment through
the middle layers according to the routing scheme; each vertex has a color in {0, 1,⊥}3.
It is important to note that the middle layers do not perform any computation - they
only copy symbols according to a fixed routing. In particular, if we change one entry in the
representation of LocalEndOfALine vertex u, we can locally compute the difference of the
old and new assignments for every middle layer node, even if we don’t know the old assignment
itself (which may correspond to up to three values routed through that node).
Notice that in order to verify that u ∈ V local, we need to check that the active/inactive
pattern matches the counter, and the “local conditions”. Given a coloring of the Extended
Shuffle-F-Exchange graph, checking the local conditions reduces to checking that the color
for each first-layer vertex is equal to the color on the respective vertex on the last layer, and
that the color of every vertex not in the first layer is computed correctly from its incoming
neighbors.
6.2 Arithmetization
We now want to represent the verification of u ∈ V local as constraints on polynomials over
G (do not confuse with polynomials over F2!).
We represent each vertex u ∈ V local as two polynomials: Tu : F t−1 × E → C and
Tcounter : F t−1 → C, where C ⊂ F is a subset of F of constant size. For each(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αi
) ∈ F t−1 × E , we set Tu (x1, . . . , xt−1, αi) to be equal to the color assigned
to the respective vertex. Tcounter (x1, . . . , xt−1) is assigned 1 if the corresponding line should
be active, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we construct a polynomial TS,P : F t−1 × E → C′,
for C ⊂ C′ ⊂ F of size |C′| = Θ
(
log3/2 n
)
; TS,P (·) represents the instance of EndOfALine:
for each
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, α5t`
) ∈ F t−1 × {α5t`}, it specifies the gate functionality, whereas for
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(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αi
)
(i < 5t`) it specifies the routing through this vertex. Note that each vertex
takes its inputs from at most 3 out of Θ
(√
log n
)
incoming edges.
Notice that Tu, Tcounter, TS,P are all polynomials of degree at most |F| , |E| in their re-
spective variables. The verifier will expect low degree extensions of Tu, TS,P on all of Gt, and
analogously for Tcounter over Gt−1.
In the following, keep in mind that Tcounter is constructed implicitly (once we decode all
log2 n + O (1) bits of the counter), and TS,P is part of the input of the problem, so we only
need to locally decode and verify the validity of Tu.
First, we construct a polynomial
Ψ (x) , ψ (Tu (x)) ,
∏
c∈C
(Tu (x)− c) , (10)
such that ψ (Tu (x)) = 0 iff Tu (x) ∈ C.
Similarly, we would like to construct a polynomial that verifies that the colors are prop-
agated correctly through the middle layers; for the last layer, it should also verify that the
gate functionality is implemented correctly. First, we describe the edges of the Extended
Shuffle-F-Exchange graph with the following affine transformations:
ρStatic
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αi+1
)
,
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αi
)
ρShuffle
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αi+1
)
,
(
xt−1, x1, . . . , xt−2, αi
)
ρ0
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αi+1
)
,
(
x1 +
[
z0
]
, . . . , xt−1, αi
)
...
ρ`−1
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αi+1
)
,
(
x1 +
[
z`−1
]
, . . . , xt−1, αi
)
(So each vertex x ∈ F t−1×(E \ {1}) has incoming edges from ρStatic (x) , ρShuffle (x) , ρ0 (x) ,
. . . , ρ`−1 (x).)
Now we can define a polynomial
Φ (x) , φ
(
Tu (x) , Tu (ρStatic (x))Tu (ρShuffle (x)) , Tu (ρ0 (x)) , . . . , Tu (ρ`−1 (x)) , T(S,P ) (x)
)
,
(11)
where for x ∈ F t−1 × (E \ {1, α5t`}), φ (· · · ) = 0 iff the colors are propagated correctly
to the corresponding vertex, and for x ∈ F t × {α5t`}, φ (· · · ) further checks that the gate
functionality is implemented correctly.
Finally, we add a third polynomial over F t−1,
Ξ (x) , ξ
(
Tu (x1, . . . , xt−1, 1) , Tu
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, α5t`
)
, Tcounter (x1, . . . , xt−1)
)
, (12)
which is zero iff Tu (x1, . . . , xt−1, 1) = Tu
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, α5t`
)
and the corresponding line is
active or inactive as dictated by Tcounter (x1, . . . , xt−1).
We now have that u ∈ V local is equivalent to AND of the following conditions:
• Values-in-domain: Ψ (x) = 0 for all x ∈ F t−1 × E ;
• Value-propagation and computation:Φ (x) = 0 for all x ∈ F t−1 × (E \ {1}); and
• Active-vs-inactive: Ξ (x) = 0 for all x ∈ F t−1.
Notice also that ψ, ξ are constant total degree polynomials, whereas φ has total degree
polylogn; thus Ψ,Φ,Ξ are of degrees |F| · polylogn, |E| · polylogn ≤ |G| /2 in their respective
variables.
27
6.3 PCP
Our verifier should test that Ψ,Φ,Ξ are zero everywhere on the respective domains (F t−1 ×
E ,F t−1 × (E \ {1}) ,F t−1). We describe the test for Ψ; the corresponding tests for Φ and Ξ
follow analogously.
In order to test that Ψ (x) is zero over all of F t−1×E , consider the following polynomials:
Ψ
′ (
x1, . . . , xt−1, αj
)
,
∑
fit/2+1
,...,fit−1∈F
j′∈{1,...,5t`}
Ψ
(
x1, . . . , xt/2, fit/2+1 , . . . , fit−1 , α
j
′) t−1∏
k=t/2+1
xik−1k ·
(
αj
)j′
(13)
Ψ
′′ (
x1, . . . , xt−1, αj
)
,
∑
fi1 ,...,fit/2∈F
Ψ
′ (
fi1 , . . . , fit/2 , xt/2+1, . . . , xt−1, α
j
) t/2∏
k=1
xik−1k . (14)
In particular, observe that
Ψ
′′ (
x1, . . . , xt−1, αj
)
=
∑
fi1
,...,fit−1∈F
j′∈{1,...,5t`}
Ψ
(
fi1 , . . . , fit−1 , α
j′
)
·
t−1∏
k=1
xik−1k ·
(
αj
)j′
.
The main point of this construction is that Ψ′′ is the zero polynomial if and only if Ψ (x) = 0
for every x ∈ F t−1 × E . Now, by definition, Ψ′′ has degrees at most |F| , |E| in each variable,
respectively, so it suffices to test that it is indeed zero at one random point from Gt.
The verifier should also ensure that Ψ′ and Ψ′′ are constructed correctly. This is done by
picking a uniformly random x ∈ Gt and verifying that (13) and(14) hold. If Ψ is constructed
correctly, then Ψ′ also has low degrees in each variable (compared to |G|), so it suffices to test
on a single x ∈ Gt. Similarly, the verifier should also check that Ψ is constructed correctly as
in (10); thanks to the low-degree guarantee, a single x ∈ Gt suffices here as well.
Notice that the verifier does not need to receive Ψ′′ explicitly. (This is crucial later for the
proof construction!) Testing that Ψ′′ is constructed correctly at
(
x1, . . . , xt−1, αj
)
and that it
is zero at the same point is equivalent to simply testing that
∑
fi1 ,...,fit/2∈F
Ψ
′ (
fi1 , . . . , fit/2 , xt/2+1, . . . , xt−1, α
j
) t/2∏
k=1
xik−1k = 0. (15)
We also need to test that all polynomials are indeed low degree. We do this later, in
Subsection 6.7.
Define and test Φ′ ,Ξ′ analogously to Ψ′ . We conclude that if Tu,Ψ,Φ,Ξ,Ψ
′
,Φ
′
,Ξ
′ are
all indeed of low degrees as promised and the verifier accepts with probability greater than
, then Tu, Tcounter represent a real vertex u ∈ V local. Notice that all of our tests choose
x ∈ Gt/2 with uniform marginal probabilities.
For simplicity of notation, we henceforth treat Ξ (·) as t-variate polynomial (with the t-th
variable being a dummy variable).
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6.4 The final encoding
Our proof Π (u) consists of the following strings.
• C (u) consists of a good encoding of the “counter” of u. (Notice that we require a succinct
encoding that can be fully decoded, and then the entire Tcounter can be computed
locally.)
• E (u) consists of the polynomial Tu : Gt → G.
• pi (u) consists of the polynomials Ψ,Ψ′ ,Φ,Φ′,Ξ,Ξ′ : Gt → G.
Although they have different lengths (in particular, C (u) is much shorter), we think of them
as having equal “weights”, i.e. we allow only a constant fraction of errors in each. Also, we
think of symbols in larger alphabets as encoded with a good binary error correcting code.
6.5 Local decoding and error correction
When a typical PCP verifier is given a proof that is wrong even at a single bit, it is already
allowed to reject the proof. For our purpose, we want a more lenient verifier that, when given a
proof that is wrong at a small fraction of the bits, corrects those bits and accepts. Furthermore,
we want to ensure that our verifier only uses very little randomness: only (1/2 + o (1)) log2 n
random bits. A second goal of this subsection is to establish the desideratum that the verifier
can adaptively decode an arbitrary qcritical-tuple of entries from the proof.
We describe how to locally decode and correct Ψ; Tu,Ψ
′
,Φ,Ξ,Φ
′
,Ξ
′ follow with minor
modifications, whereas the counter has a succinct representation and can be fully decoded.
Specifically, the verifier needs to decode Ψ in order to test (10), (13). For (10) the verifier
only needs to decode Ψ at one uniformly random point, so this is the easy case. For (13), the
verifier wants to decode an entire axis-parallel (t/2)-dimensional affine subspace, Q(x1,...,xt/2) ,{(
x1, . . . , xt/2
)}× Gt/2, for a uniformly random choice of (x1, . . . , xt/2) ∈ Gt/2.
Let S ⊂ Gt/2 be a (1/ (t2 log |G|))-biased set of cardinality |S| = poly (t, log |G|) (as guaran-
teed by Section 2.1). We pick a uniformly random x =
(
x1, . . . , xt/2
) ∈ Gt/2, and a uniformly
random y =
(
y1, . . . , yt/2
) ∈ S. We then consider the (t/2 + 1)-dimensional affine subspace
Rx,y ,
⋃
β∈G Q(x+βy). If Ψ̂ is O (Decode)-close to Ψ, we have by Lemma 2.4 that with prob-
ability 1 − o (1), the restriction of Ψ̂ to Rx,y, denoted Ψ̂ |Rx,y , is also O (Decode)-close to
Ψ |Rx,y . Whenever this is the case, the verifier correctly decodes Ψ on Rx,y.
Notice that so far, our verifier queries |G|t/2+1 = n1/2+o(1) symbols, and uses log2
∣∣Gt/2∣∣+
log2 |S| = (1/2 + o (1)) log2 n random bits.
The local decoding for Tu,Ψ
′
,Φ,Ξ,Φ
′
,Ξ
′ follows with minor modifications which we now
describe. Notice that we can reuse the same random bits from the decoding of Ψ to decode
each of the other polynomials. For (14) the verifier wants to decode Ψ′ (equivalently for
Φ
′
,Ξ
′) on a subspace that fixes the second half of the coordinates, Q′
(xt/2+1,...,xt)
, Gt/2 ×{(
xt/2+1, . . . , xt
)}
.
For (10) and (12), the verifier also needs to decode one or two entries of Tu,
but this is no harder than decoding an entire plane. For (11), there is some sub-
tlety: Φ (x) is a function of the values of Tu on a super-constant number (` +
3 = Θ
(√
log n
)
) of points x, ρStatic (x) , ρShuffle (x) , ρ0 (x) , . . . , ρ`−1 (x). Observe that
x, ρStatic (x) , ρ0 (x) , . . . , ρ`−1 (x) all belong to the same (t/2)-dimensional subspace (only the
first and last coordinates change); thus we only need to apply subspace-decoding twice.
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Notice that our decoding mechanism also suffices to locally correct errors (with probability
at least (1− o (1)), and assuming that we start with a function that is close to low-degrees).
Furthermore, by Lemma 2.4, the distance
∣∣∣Ψ̂ |Rx,y −Ψ |Rx,y ∣∣∣ is within ±o (1) of the global dis-
tance
∣∣∣Ψ̂−Ψ∣∣∣. Handling the rest of the polynomials as described in the previous paragraphs,
we can thus estimate
∣∣∣Π̂ |E,pi −Π (u) |E,pi∣∣∣ to within ±o (1); for the bits that correspond to the
counter, we can compute the distance exactly.
Decoding a particular subspace
Above, we described how to locally decode a random subspace. Suppose instead that we want
to locally decode Ψ |Q(w1,...,wt/2) for some particular w ∈ G
t/2 (specifically, when Q(w1,...,wt/2)
contains information about one of the critical bits). Since we did not waste any random bits
on picking w, we can afford to pick y uniformly from all of Gt/2. On the other hand, since
w is arbitrary, there may still be an Θ (Decode) chance that
∣∣∣Ψ̂ |Rw,y −Ψ |Rw,y ∣∣∣ is too large
(> 1/2) to guarantee correct decoding. Instead, we pick a third vector z ∈ S, and query
Ψ̂ on the (t/2 + 2)-dimensional affine subspace Pw,y,z ,
⋃
β,γ∈G Q(w+β(y+γz)); notice that
Pw,y,z ,
⋃
γ∈G Rw,y+γz. In expectation, for each (y + γz)’s, the restriction Ψ̂ |Rw,y+γz is at
distance at most O (Decode) from Ψ |Rw,y+γz . Therefore, by Lemma 2.4, with probability
1− o (1), we have that
∣∣∣Ψ̂ |Pw,y,z −Ψ |Pw,y,z∣∣∣ = O (Decode).
6.6 Local proof-construction
We now want to establish the following unusual property of our holographic proof scheme: we
can, with high probability, locally construct any subspace Q(x1,...,xt/2) of the proof pi (u), by
reading only a small part of the encoding E (u) (in particular, we need to decode a constant
number of (t/2 + 1)-dimensional subspaces from E (u)). Here, it is important that Q(x1,...,xt/2)
is defined via a restriction of the first t/2 coordinates, but we assume access to decoded
subspaces of E (u) with restriction of any (t/2)-tuple of coordinates.
Recall that in order to compute Ψ (x) or Ξ (x), it suffices to know the values of Tu at a
constant number of locations ((10) and (12)), so here this property trivially holds. For Φ (x),
we need to know Tu at Θ
(√
log n
)
locations (11); however, as we argue in Subsection 6.5, they
belong to two axis-parallel subspaces, so it again suffices to decode Tu on a constant number
of subspaces.
In order to compute Ψ′ (x) ,Φ′ (x) ,Ξ′ (x), we need to correctly decode the values of
Ψ,Φ,Ξ on (almost) an entire axis-parallel subspace Q(x1,...,xt/2). The values of Ψ,Φ,Ξ
are not given as part of E (u), but (as we argued in the previous paragraph), we can
reconstruct them from Tu. Specifically, in order to know the values of Ψ or Ξ on Q(x1,...,xt/2),
we simply need to decode Tu on Q(x1,...,xt/2). In order to construct Φ on an entire
subspace, observe that for every
(
x1, . . . , xt/2, fit/2+1 , . . . , fit−1 , α
j
)
∈ Q(x1,...,xt/2), all the vec-
tors ρStatic
(
x1, . . . , xt/2, fit/2+1 , . . . , fit−1 , α
j
)
, ρ0
(
x1, . . . , xt/2, fit/2+1 , . . . , fit−1 , α
j
)
, . . . ,
ρ`−1
(
x1, . . . , xt/2, fit/2+1 , . . . , fit−1 , α
j
)
belong to the same subspace Q(x1,...,xt/2).
Furthermore, all the vectors ρShuffle
(
x1, . . . , xt/2, fit/2+1 , . . . , fit−1 , α
j
)
=
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(
fit−1 , x1, . . . , xt/2, fit/2+1 , . . . , fit−2 , α
j
)
belong to the subspace QShuffle
(x1,...,xt/2)
,
G × (x1, . . . , xt/2) × Gt/2−1. Therefore the value of Φ′ (x) can also be computed from
the values of Tu on a constant number of subspaces.
6.7 Local robust testing
So far, we assumed that we are given functions that are low degree (Subsection 6.3), or
approximately low degree (Subsection 6.5). However, we must verify that this is indeed the
case.
We will use results for locally testing tensor codes [68]. In order to describe them, let
us briefly introduce some minimal background and notation. Given linear codes C1, C2 with
respective generator matrices M1,M2, their tensor product, denoted C1⊗C2 is the linear code
generated by the tensor product of the matricesM1⊗M2. We say that C1⊗C2 is a tensor code.
In general, we can talk about the tensor product of k codes, C1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ck, which is defined
recursively. We say that C1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ck is the k-th power of C (denoted Ck), if Ci = C for
all i ∈ [k]. In our case, for example, the code C of all (|G| /2)-individual degrees polynomials
T : Gt → G is the t-th power of the code of all (|G| /2)-degree polynomials t : G → G.
Alternatively, we can think of any product code as a function from some product domain
to some range. The (axis-parallel) hyperplane tester picks a uniformly random index i ∈ [k],
and a uniformly random value vi from the i-th domain. It reads the assignment of the function
for all vectors that have vi in their i-th coordinate, and tests whether they form (or are close
to) a codeword from C1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Ci−1 ⊗Ci+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Ck. Going back to our setting, this could
mean selecting a random i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, and a random value vi ∈ G; reading T (x) for all x
such that xi = vi, and verifying that the restricted (t− 1)-variate function is close to a low
degrees polynomial.
To optimize query complexity, it will be more convenient for us to think of the code of
(t/4)-variate (|G| /2)-individual degrees polynomials Tt/4 : Gt/4 → G, henceforth denoted C1/4.
The code C can now be written C = (C1/4)4. The hyperplane tester now chooses a random
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and a random value vi ∈ Gt/4, and reads T (x) for all x whose restriction to the
i-th (t/4)-tuple of coordinates is equal to vi.
We can now apply the following theorem due to Viderman [68]:
Theorem 6.2. [68, Theorem 4.4] Let C = C1⊗ · · · ⊗Ck be the tensor product of k > 2 linear
codes of relative distances δ1, . . . , δk. Let M be a string which is -far from the tensor code
C. Then the restriction of M to a random hyperplane drawn from the above distribution is, in
expectation, at least
(
 ·
∏k
j=1 δj
2k2
)
-far from the restricted code C1⊗· · ·⊗Ci−1⊗Ci+1⊗· · ·⊗Ck.
Let S1/4 ⊂ Gt/4 be a
(
1/
(
t2 log |G|))-biased set of cardinality ∣∣S1/4∣∣ = poly (t, log |G|) (for
example, take the restriction of each y ⊂ S to its first t/4 entries). Sample x ∈ Gt/4 and y ∈
S1/4 uniformly at random. Run the hyperplane tester for
(C1/4)4 on each alleged polynomial
4 |G| times, taking all the possibilities for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and vi = (x+ βy) for all β ∈ G.
By Theorem 6.2, if the polynomial is Sound-far from
(C1/4)4, then the expected distance on
each of the 4 |G| tests is
(
Sound ·
∏k
j=1 δj
2k2
)
= Sound/512 (since k = 4 and δj ≥ 1/2). By
Lemma 2.4, the average over all the tests is, with probability 1 − o (1), within ±o (1) of this
expectation.
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So far the tester requires (1/4 + o (1)) log2 n random bits to sample a hyperplane, but has
prohibitively high query complexity: n3/4+o(1). In order to drive down the query complex-
ity, we can recurse on the test using fresh (1/4 + o (1)) log2 n random bits: we re-partition(C1/4)3 as a tensor product of three linear codes, and reapply Viderman’s theorem. Our query
complexity is now n1/2+o(1), the total random-bits complexity is (1/2 + o (1)) log2 n, and the
robustness guarantee is
(
Sound · 2−42·42 · 2
−3
2·32
)
− o (1) > Sound/105.
Finally, our tester accepts iff the average distance across all (t/2)-dimensional subspaces
from the nearest low-degrees polynomial is less than 2
√
Complete < Sound/
(
2 · 105). Thus
our tester accepts with high probability whenever Ψ̂ is Complete-close to the true Ψ, and re-
jects with high probability whenever Ψ̂ is Sound-far from any low degrees polynomial. (Testing
T̂u, Φ̂, Ξ̂, Ψ̂
′ , Φ̂′ , Ξ̂′ follows analogously.)
6.8 Summary
The verifier, on input Π̂ =
(
Ê, Ĉ, pi
)
, does the following.
Randomness
In a preprocessing step, the verifier fixes in advance a
(
1/
(
t2 log |G|))-biased set S of cardi-
nality |S| = poly (t, log |G|). Let S1/4 denote the restriction of S to the first t/4 coordinates.
The tester then:
• draws x uniformly at random from Gt/2, and y uniformly at random from S; and
• reusing the same randomness, draws x1,x2 ∈ Gt/4 and y1,y2 ∈ S1/4.
Queries
The verifier reads T̂u on all vectors z ∈ Gt such that one of
{(
z1, . . . , zt/2
)
,
(
z2, . . . zt/2+1
)}
is
of the form (x+ βy) for some β ∈ G. It also reads Ψ̂, Φ̂, Ξ̂, Ψ̂′ , Φ̂′ , Ξ̂′on all z ∈ Gt such that(
z1, . . . zt/2
)
= (x+ βy) for some β ∈ G (denote those vectors Rx,y). Similarly, it also reads
Ψ
′ , Φ′ , and Ξ′ on all z ∈ Gt such that (zt/2+1, . . . , zt) = (x+ βy) (denote those vectors R′x,y).
The union of all those subspaces (i.e. Rx,y ∪R′x,y) forms GPCP, while GSample , Rx,y.
For each choice of i1 6= i2 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and each β1, β2 ∈ G, the verifier reads each
polynomial on all vectors z ∈ Gt such that the i1-th (t/4)-tuple of z is equal to x1 +β1y1, and
the i2-th (t/4)-tuple of z is equal to x2+β2y2 . The union of all those subspaces forms GLTC.
Finally, the verifier also reads the entire encoding C (u) of the counter of u. Given C (u),
the verifier also picks qcritical vectors w1, . . . ,wqcritical ∈ Gt/2 that correspond to each of the
critical bits, and reads Tu on all vectors z ∈ Gt such that
(
z1, . . . , zt/2
)
=
(
wi + β (x+ βy)
)
for some β, γ ∈ G and i ∈ {1, . . . , qcritical}. Those are Gcritical.
Test
The verifier uses the hyperplane tester from Subsection 6.7 to verify that all the polynomials
are indeed close to low-degree polynomials. (If not, it suffices to return an error message and
abort.)
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Correct & decode
For each subspace queried, the verifier finds the unique low-degree polynomials
Tu,Ψ,Φ,Ξ,Ψ
′
,Φ
′
,Ξ
′ that are close to the values read.
Verify
The verifier checks that the corrected polynomials Tu,Ψ,Φ,Ξ,Ψ
′
,Φ
′
,Ξ
′ satisfy (10), (11), (12),
and (13) on all of Rx,y. It also checks that (15) (and its analogues for Φ
′
,Ξ
′) are satisfied on
all of R′x,y.
Estimate distance
The verifier also computes the hamming distance between the values of T̂u, Ψ̂, Φ̂, Ξ̂, Ψ̂
′ , Φ̂′ , Ξ̂′
and Tu,Ψ,Φ,Ξ,Ψ
′
,Φ
′
,Ξ
′ on Rx,y.
Extrapolate
Given C (u), the verifier can locally reconstruct C (Slocal (u)). Additionally, after the verifier
decoded the values of Tu at the critical bits, it also knows the current and new values of all
the entries that change between u and Slocal (u). Since E (·) is a linear encoding, the verifier
can also completely construct the difference vector E (Slocal (u)) − E (u). In other words,
given the value of Tu (x) for any x, the verifier can locally compute TSlocal(u) (x).
The verifier can use the ideas from Subsection (6.6) to also construct the values of all the
polynomials (Ψ,Φ,Ξ,Ψ′ ,Φ′ ,Ξ′) for Slocal (u), on all of Rx,y.
For P local (u), the verifier must first check that u is not the special vertex u0. This is
easy to do since Tu and the respective Tu0 are both low degree polynomials and must differ (if
u 6= u0) on a constant fraction of their entries. If indeed u 6= u0, recovering information about
P local (u) is completely analogous to the procedure for Slocal (u). Otherwise, we simply have
P local (u0) = u0.
7 Polymatrix WeakNash
In this section we prove our main technical result:
Theorem 7.1. There exists a constant Nash > 0, such that there is a 2n
1/2+o(1)-time re-
duction from EndOfALine to finding an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash of
a complete bipartite polymatrix game between n1/2+o(1) players with 2n1/2+o(1) actions each; the
payoffs in each bimatrix subgame are in [0, 1/nB] , [0, 1/nA], where nA, nB denote the number
of players on each side of the bipartite graph.
We construct a subexponential polymatrix game that implements a variant of the hard
Brouwer function constructed in Section 3. The new Brouwer function is very similar, but we
make the following modifications:
• We use the vertices of a LocalEndOfALine instance instead of EndOfALine.
• Instead of encoding each LocalEndOfALine vertex u with an arbitrary error correct-
ing code, the Brouwer vertices correspond to the holographic proofs Π (u) from Section
6.
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• For convenience of notation, instead of maintaining m coordinates (which we expect
to be identical anyway), for each of the auxiliary compute-vs-copy bit and the special
direction, we keep just one coordinate for each, but give each a constant relative weight.
• In particular, the “first” Brouwer line segment goes from z2 , (Π (u0) ,Π (u0) , 0, 2) to
(Π (u0) ,Π (u0) , 0, 0).
The rest proof proceeds as follows: In Subsection 7.1, we define the strategy space for the
players and relate it to the holographic proof system from Section 6. In Subsection 7.2 we
introduce some important notation used throughout this section. In the next two subsections
(7.3 and 7.4) we define the players’ payoffs, and implement an imitation gadget, assuming that
the Brouwer function f can be locally computed. In Subsection 7.5, we translate the PCP
guarantees from Proposition 6.1 to guarantees about approximate equilibria of our polymatrix
game. This completes the setup of the argument. The rest of this section (Subsections 7.6-7.9)
shows that we can indeed locally compute f in the different regions where it is defined (outside
the picture, close to a Brouwer line segment, etc.).
7.1 Players and strategies
Let RPCP denote the set of random strings used by the PCP verifier in Proposition 6.1. For
each r ∈ RPCP we construct a player (A, r) on one side of the bipartite game. On the opposite
side, we construct a player (B,q) for every q ∈ Gt/2. We refer to the respective sides of the
bipartite game as Alice’s players and Bob’s players. (In Section 8 we will construct a bimatrix
game between Alice and Bob where each player “controls” the vertices on her or his side of
the polymatrix game.)
Each player has (3/Precision + 1)n
1/2+o(1)+2 actions. We think of each action as an ordered
tuple of:
• two vectors in [−1, 2]n1/2+o(1) , where the interval [−1, 2] is discretized into
{−1,−1 + Precision, . . . , 2− Precision, 2}; and
• two more variables in [−1, 2].
Recall that each Brouwer vertex corresponds to a pair (u, v) of either identical or consecutive
vertices from the LocalEndOfALine instance. For player (A, r), the two vectors allegedly
correspond to bits read from two holographic proofs (a-la Section 6) (Π (u) ,Π (v)) by the PCP
verifier with random string r. For player (B,q) the vectors represent (a binary encoding of)
the counters C (u) , C (v), and the entries of E (u) , pi (u) , E (v) , pi (v) on a (t/2)-dimensional
subspace G(B,q) ⊂ Gt to be specified below.
The additional two variables represent the compute-vs-copy bit and the special direction.
In addition to the assignments described above, each player on Alice’s side has an additional
choice among (3/Precision + 1)n
1/2+o(1)
actions. These additional actions allegedly correspond
to 2qcritical (affine, (t/2 + 2)-dimensional) subspaces from which we can decode the qcritical
critical bits of each of the vertices. (We know which entries are represented by reading the
“counter” part of the proof.)
Bob’s subspace G(B,q)
Let G(A,r)All ⊂ Gt denote the set of entries of E (·) , pi (·) read by the PCP verifier with random
string r. Recall that the PCP verifier picks a set of (t/2)-dimensional axis-parallel affine
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subspaces; each subspace is an affine shift of a linear subspace, spanned by one of a constant
number of (t/2)-tuples of standard basis vectors. We pick G(B,q) so that it is spanned by
vectors that are linearly independent of all those tuples. In particular, G(B,q) intersects each
of (A, r)’s subspaces at exactly one point.
For any (t/2)-tuple of standard basis vectors of Gt, a uniformly random (t/2)-tuple of new
vectors in Gt completes it to a basis with high probability. To see this, consider adding the
new vectors one by one; at each step, there is at least a (1− 1/ |G|)-probability that it is
linearly independent of the previously chosen vectors; the claim follows by union bound and
t = o (|G|). Therefore, a random (t/2)-tuple of vectors will also, with high probability, be
simultaneously linearly independent of each of the relevant tuples of standard basis vectors.
Fix any such a (t/2)-tuple (there are also efficient ways to deterministically find such a tuple,
but in quasi-polynomial time we can simply brute-force enumerate through all tuples).
Finally, we let G(B,0t/2) be the linear subspace spanned by those vectors; for general
q ∈ Gt/2, we let G(B,q) be the same subspace shifted by (q,0t/2).
7.2 Notation
We introduce some necessary additional notation for formally handling vectors in this section.
The notation for (A, r)’s assignment to the critical bits is analogous in spirit but more subtle
to formalize; we come back to it to Subsection 7.3.
Definition 7.2. We say that a player is happy if every strategy on her support is Nash-
optimal.
Rounding For x ∈ R, let ν (x) ,
{
1 x > 1/2
0 otherwise
denote the rounding of x to {0, 1}; for
x ∈ Rn, we compute ν (x) coordinate-wise.
Coordinates Let M , {1, . . . , 2m+ 2} denote the set of all coordinates. We partition M
into: M1 , {1, . . . ,m} (the first proof), M2 , {m+ 1, . . . , 2m} (the second proof), M3 ,
{2m+ 1} (the Compute-vs-Copy bit), and M4 , {2m+ 2} (the special direction). We will
also use the abbreviations M1,2 ,M1 ∪M2 and M3,4 ,M3 ∪M4.
Fix some player (A, r) on Alice’s side; we further detail (A, r)’s strategy space as follows.
Let G(A,r)Sample, G
(A,r)
PCP, G
(A,r)
LTC ⊂ Gt denote the sets of entries of E (·) , pi (·) read by the PCP
verifier with random string r from the alleged proofs. Let I(A,r)Sample, I
(A,r)
PCP , I
(A,r)
LTC ⊂M1,2 denote
the indices of the corresponding bits, respectively. For player (B,q) on Bob’s side, let I(B,q) ⊂
M1,2 denote the indices of the bits corresponding to G(B,q). We also let K ⊂ M1,2 (K for
Kounter) denote the set of indices that correspond to the encodings of counters in both proofs.
(Notice that K is the same for every player on both sides.)
Finally we will be particularly interested in the following sets:
J (A,r) , K ∪ I(A,r)Sample ∪M3,4
J (B,q) , K ∪ I(B,q) ∪M3,4.
Partial vectors Player (A, r)’s strategy a naturally corresponds to a partial vector x(a)All ∈
([−1, 2] ∪ {⊥})M . For i ∈ K ∪ I(A,r)PCP ∪ I(A,r)LTC ∪M3,4, we set the i-th coordinate of x(a)All to the
value that a assigns to the corresponding coordinate; for all other i’s, we let x(a)All |i,⊥.
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In particular we are interested in the partial vector x(a) ∈ ([−1, 2] ∪ {⊥})M that describes
(A, r)’s partial assignment to J (A,r). For i ∈ J (A,r), we set the i-th coordinate of x(a) to the
value that a assigns to the corresponding coordinate; for all other i’s, we let x(a) |i,⊥.
For action b taken by player (B,q), we can simply define one partial vector x(b) ∈
([−1, 2] ∪ {⊥})M , where x(b) |i,⊥ for i /∈ J (B,q).
Partial norms All norms in this section are 2-norm: we henceforth drop the 2 subscript
from ‖·‖2. Instead, we will use the subscript to denote the subset of coordinates over which
we want to compute the norm. For example,
‖x‖2K , Ei∈K
[
x2i
]
.
In fact, we are often interested in expectation with respect to a non-uniform distribution; for
example:
‖x‖2J(A,r) ,
1
4
E
i∈I(A,r)Sample
[
x2i
]
+
1
4
Ei∈K
[
x2i
]
+
1
2
Ei∈M3,4
[
x2i
]
‖x‖2J(B,q) ,
1
4
Ei∈I(B,q)
[
x2i
]
+
1
4
Ei∈K
[
x2i
]
+
1
2
Ei∈M3,4
[
x2i
]
.
The distribution is set such that each part (e.g. K, I(A,r)PCP , I
(B,q), or M1, . . . ,M4) receives an
equal weight (up to constant factors). The distribution will henceforth be implicit, and only
the subset of coordinates will be explicit.
This notation also allows us to talk about distances between partial vectors, e.g.∥∥∥x(a) − x(b)∥∥∥2
J(A,r)∩J(B,q)
, 1
4
∥∥∥x(a) − x(b)∥∥∥2
K
+
1
2
∥∥∥x(a) − x(b)∥∥∥2
M3,4
+
1
4
∥∥∥x(a) − x(b)∥∥∥2
I
(A,r)
Sample∩I(B,q)
.
Aggregate vectors Let A denote the joint (product) distribution over all Alice’s players’
mixed strategies, and define B analogously for Bob’s players. We define x(A),x(B) ∈ [−1, 2]M
to be the weighted entry-wise average of x(a),x(b), respectively, where for each coordinate we
only take the expectation over vectors for which it is assigned a real (non-⊥) value.
7.3 Alice’s imitation gadget
Our first goal is to incentivize player (A, r) to imitate x(B) on her assigned coordinates. We
break up her utility on each bimatrix subgame as follows9:
U (A,r) , U (A,r)Sample + U
(A,r)
PCP + U
(A,r)
LTC + U
(A,r)
Counter + U
(A,r)
M3,4
+ U
(A,r)
critical.
For each player (B,q) on Bob’s side, we simply define the first five parts to incentivize
copying (B,q)’s strategy on each shared coordinate. Let a,b denote (A, r) and (B,q) respec-
tive strategies; then
9For convenience of notation, we define bimatrix subgames with payoffs in [−54/nB , 0] , [−36/nA, 0]. Payoffs
[0, 1/nB ] , [0, 1/nA] can be obtained by scaling and shifting.
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U
(A,r)
Sample , −
∥∥∥x(a)All − x(b)∥∥∥2
I
(A,r)
Sample∩I(B,q)
U
(A,r)
PCP , −
∥∥∥x(a)All − x(b)∥∥∥2
I
(A,r)
PCP ∩I(B,q)
U
(A,r)
LTC , −
∥∥∥x(a)All − x(b)∥∥∥2
I
(A,r)
LTC ∩I(B,q)
U
(A,r)
Counter , −
∥∥∥x(a)All − x(b)∥∥∥2
K
U
(A,r)
M3,4
, −
∥∥∥x(a)All − x(b)∥∥∥2
M3,4
.
Notice that
1
8
U
(A,r)
PCP +
1
8
U
(A,r)
LTC +
1
4
U
(A,r)
Counter +
1
2
U
(A,r)
M3,4
= −
∥∥∥x(a)All − x(b)∥∥∥2(
K∪I(A,r)PCP ∪I
(A,r)
LTC ∪M3,4
)
∩J(B,q),
whereas
1
4
U
(A,r)
Sample +
1
4
U
(A,r)
Counter +
1
2
U
(A,r)
M3,4
= −
∥∥∥x(a) − x(b)∥∥∥2
J(A,r)∩J(B,q)
.
As we mentioned earlier, we also want (A, r) to encode the critical bits for each Local-
EndOfALine vertex. The indices of this encoding depend on both:
• the indices of the critical bits - which depends on the “counter” of the two LocalEnd-
OfALine vertices, allegedly encoded in both a and b; and
• the directions in Gt/2 that the PCP verifier uses to locally decode those bits - which
depend on the random string r.
We let G(A,r)critical (a) ⊂ Gt denote the set of additional entries that encode the critical bits - as
induced by (A, r)’s strategy x(a) |K and random string r; let I(A,r)critical (a) ⊂ M1,2 denote the
corresponding bits’ indices. In order to define (A, r)’s utilities, it is actually more convenient
to use the critical bits determined by (B,q)’s b, henceforth denoted I(A,r)critical (b). (The super-
script remains (A, r) because we still decode those bits according to random string r.) This
added level of indirection prevents (A, r) from manipulating her encoding of the counter to
increase her utility from the critical bits. In other words, a includes an assignment to qcritical
affine (t/2 + 2)-dimensional subspaces of Gt. On each subgame, we subjectively interpret a’s
assignment as a partial vector x(a)critical with values in [−1, 2] on I(A,r)critical (b). In particular,
we define
U
(A,r)
critical , −
∥∥∥x(a)critical − x(b)∥∥∥2
I
(A,r)
critical(b)∩I(B,q)
.
For some choices of b, the induced assignment to the counter may be ambiguous or just far
from every codeword. However, in that case we are probably far from every Brouwer line
segment, so we don’t care what (A, r) assigns to the critical bits.
Claim 7.3. For every happy player (A, r) on Alice’s side and any action a in her support, for
each I ∈
{
I
(A,r)
Sample, I
(A,r)
PCP , I
(A,r)
LTC
}
∥∥∥x(a)All − x(B)∥∥∥2
I
= O (Nash) .
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Proof. Recall that (A, r)’s total utility from her assignment to I(A,r)LTC is given by
U
(A,r)
LTC = −Eq∈Gt/2Eb∼B[(B,q)]
[∥∥∥x(a)All − x(b)∥∥∥2
I
(A,r)
LTC ∩I(B,q)
]
= −E
i∈I(A,r)LTC
[(
x
(a)
All |i −Eb∼B[(B,q(i))]
[
x(b) |i
])2]− E
i∈I(A,r)LTC
[
Varb∼B[(B,q(i))]
[
x(b) |i
]]
,
(16)
where (B,q (i)) is the player on Bob’s side for which i ∈ I(B,q(i)) (i.e. q (i) denotes the value
q ∈ Gt/2 such that bit i is part of the representation of some g ∈ G(B,q)).
Notice that the second term of (16) does not depend on (A, r)’s strategy, so she simply
wants to maximize the first term. For every i, she can approximate Eb∼B[(B,q(i))]
[
x(b) |i
]
to
within ±Precision. Therefore, if a is an Nash-optimal strategy, we have
U
(A,r)
PCP ≥ −Ei∈I(A,r)PCP
[
Varb∼B[(B,q(i))]
[
x(b) |i
]]
− Nash − 2Precision︸ ︷︷ ︸
=O(Nash)
.
An analogous argument works for I(A,r)Sample, I
(A,r)
PCP .
The following claims follow along the same lines:
Claim 7.4. For every happy player (A, r) on Alice’s side and any action a in her support,∥∥∥x(a) − x(B)∥∥∥2
K
= O (Nash) .
Claim 7.5. For every happy player (A, r) on Alice’s side and any action a in her support,∥∥∥x(a) − x(B)∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash) .
Corollary 7.6. Let (A,B) be an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash, then∥∥∥x(A) − x(B)∥∥∥2
M
= O (Nash) .
7.4 Bob’s imitation gadget
We would like to also have the players on Bob’s side minimize
∥∥f (x(A))− x(b)∥∥2
J(B,q)
. In order
to implement this in a polymatrix game, we want to locally compute f (·) given access only to
the partial information provided by player (A, r)’s strategy a. In Section 3.3 we argued that
we can locally compute fi (x) using only approximate, partial information about x. The main
goal of this section is to argue that for most i ∈ J (A,r), we can compute this partial information
from a, approximately and with high probability over r. Before we do that, however, let us
assume that that we have some estimate f (a) |i and derive the utility of player (B,q).
For any action a that (A, r) plays, we define a partial target vector f (a) ∈ ([−1, 2] ∪ {⊥})M
that we would like (B,q) to imitate. In particular, (B,q) is incentivized to play a strategy
that is close to f (a) on the coordinates where both f (a) and x(b) are defined. We define,
U (B,q) , −
∥∥∥f (a) − x(b)∥∥∥2
J(A,r)∩J(B,q)
.
Similarly to x(A) and x(B), let f (A) ∈ [−1, 2]M denote the weighted entry-wise average of
f (a), where for each i we take an average over f (a) |i for all a in the support of (A, r), for r
such that i ∈ J (A,r).
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Claim 7.7. For every happy player (B,q), on Bob’s side and any action b in his support,∥∥∥x(b) − f (A)∥∥∥2
J(B,q)
= O (Nash) .
Proof. Analogous to Claim 7.3.
Corollary 7.8. Let (A,B) be an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash, then∥∥∥x(B) − f (A)∥∥∥2
M
= O (Nash) .
For the rest of this section, our goal is to prove that f (A) is also close to f
(
x(B)
)
- this
would prove that x(B) is an approximate fixed point of f .
7.5 Reading the holographic proofs
In this subsection we translate the desiderata from Proposition 6.1 to guarantees about ap-
proximate equilibria in our game. Our first task in approximating f
(
x(B)
)
is deciding whether
x(B) is close to a Brouwer line segment, close to a Brouwer vertex, or far from both. Close to
any Brouwer vertex, both restrictions x(B) |M1 and x(B) |M2 are close to some Π (u) ,Π (v), for
some u, v ∈ V local; close to a Brouwer line, at least one of x(B) |M1 and x(B) |M2 is close to
some Π (u).
The first step of this first task is to decide whether x(B) |M1 is close to some Π (u). Formally,
we have a game verifier that encapsulates rounding assignments in [−1, 2]M to {0, 1}M and
feeding them to the PCP verifier. Given that player (A, r) chooses strategy a, we say that the
game verifier accepts a |M1 if:
• x(a) |M1 is close to binary, i.e.∥∥∥x(a) − ν (x(a) |M1)∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
<
√
Complete;
• and the PCP verifier accepts the rounded bits it reads from the first proof, ν
(
x
(a)
All |M1
)
.
If either of those does not hold, we say that the game verifier rejects a |M1 .
The main idea in all the lemmata below is that by the Good Sample desideratum in
Proposition 6.1, G(A,r)Sample, G
(A,r)
PCP, G
(A,r)
LTC and G
(A,r)
critical (a) are all representing samples of
Gt. Therefore, if x(B) |M1 is close to {0, 1}M1 , then we expect that x(B) |M1∩I(A,r)PCP is also
close to {0, 1}M1∩I(A,r)PCP . By Claim 7.3, we can then also expect that x(a)All |M1∩I(A,r)PCP is
close to the same vector in {0, 1}M1∩I(A,r)PCP . Furthermore, if x(a)All |M1∩I(A,r)PCP is -close to
some binary vector ν
(
x(B) |
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
)
, then its rounding, ν
(
x
(a)
All |M1∩I(A,r)PCP
)
, is also O ()-
close to ν
(
x(B) |
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
)
: On each coordinate i, if the two binary vectors disagree (if∣∣∣ν (x(B) |i)− ν (x(a)All |i)∣∣∣ = 1), then we must have ∣∣ν (x(B) |i)− x(B) |i∣∣+ ∣∣∣x(B) |i −x(a)All |i∣∣∣ ≥
1/2. Finally, if ν
(
x
(a)
All |M1∩I(A,r)PCP
)
is close to ν
(
x(B) |
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
)
for most a, then we can argue
that reading ν
(
x
(a)
All |M1∩I(A,r)PCP
)
is almost like sampling ν
(
x(B) |M1
)
, and then letting an adap-
tive adversary corrupt a small fraction of the entries. Therefore, we can use the guarantees of
the PCP verifier with robust soundness / decoding / completeness.
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7.5.1 Soundness
Lemma 7.9. Let (A,B) be an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash. If∥∥x(B) −Π (u)∥∥2
M1
> 4Sound for every u ∈ V local, then for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction
of r’s, the game verifier rejects a |M1 for every strategy a in the support of (A, r).
Proof. Suppose that
∥∥x(B) −Π (u)∥∥2
M1
> 4Sound. Then by triangle inequality we have that
at least one of the following holds:
∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1
> 3Sound (17)∥∥∥ν (x(B))−Π (u)∥∥∥2
M1
> Sound (18)
Far from {0, 1}M1
Assume first that (17) holds. We can further break (17) into its K-component and (E, pi)-
component:∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1
=
1
2
∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩K
+
1
2
∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1\K
(19)
When restricted to a random r ∈ RPCP, we can learn the first term exactly, and estimate the
second term via the proxy: ∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)Sample
.
By the Good Sample guarantee from Proposition 6.1, the
(
M1 ∩ I(A,r)Sample
)
-restricted distance
between x(B) and ν
(
x(B)
)
concentrates (to within ±o (1), with high probability) around its
expectation (the last term of (19)). Therefore, with probability (1− o (1)) over the choice of
r ∈ RPCP,∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
≥ 1
4
∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1 ∩ J (A,r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=M1∩
(
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
)
= Ω
(
3Sound
)
.
For any such r, if player (A, r) is also happy, we have by Claim 7.5 that for every strategy a
in her support, ∥∥∥x(a) − ν (x(a))∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
= Ω
(
3Sound
) √Complete. (20)
Close to {0, 1}M1, but far from every Π (u)
Alternatively, assume that x(B) |M1 is close to {0, 1}M1 , but (18) holds: we have a binary
vector ν
(
x(B) |M1
)
which is Sound-far from a valid proof.
We assume wlog that (17) is false, namely∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1
≤ 3Sound.
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By the Good Sample guarantee in Proposition (6.1), we have that for (1− o (1))-fraction of
r’s, also ∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
= O
(
3Sound
)
. (21)
By Claim 7.3, for every happy (A, r) and every strategy a in her support,
∥∥∥x(a)All − x(B)∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
= O
(
3Sound
)
.
Therefore, combining with (21), we have:∥∥∥ν (x(a)All)− ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
= O
(
3Sound
)
,
and analogous arguments hold forM1∩K andM1∩I(A,r)LTC . Therefore, by the Robust soundness
guarantee in Proposition 6.1, the game verifier rejects every a |M1 for all but an o (1)-fraction
of happy (A, r)’s.
7.5.2 Completeness
Lemma 7.10. Let (A,B) be an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash. If∥∥x(B) −Π (u)∥∥2
M1
≤ 14Complete for some u ∈ V local, then for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of
r’s, and every strategy a in the support of (A, r), the game verifier accepts a |M1.
Proof. First, notice that the premise implies that,∥∥∥ν (x(B))−Π (u)∥∥∥2
M1
≤ Complete. (22)
(Since for any i ∈M1,
∥∥ν (x(B))−Π (u)∥∥2
i
≤ 4 ∥∥x(B) −Π (u)∥∥2
i
.)
Furthermore, we also have that∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1
≤
∥∥∥x(B) −Π (u)∥∥∥2
M1
≤ 1
4
Complete.
Therefore, by the Good Sample guarantee from Proposition 6.1, we also have that for a
(1− o (1))-fraction of r’s,
∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
= O (Complete) .
Combining with Claim 7.3, we get that whenever (A, r) is also happy,∥∥∥x(a)All − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
= O (Complete) .
Thus, as in (22), we have∥∥∥ν (x(a)All)− ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)PCP
= O (Complete) .
Analogous arguments hold for M1 ∩ K and M1 ∩ I(A,r)LTC . Therefore, for a (1−O (Nash))-
fraction of (A, r)’s, sampling ν
(
x
(a)
All |M1
)
satisfies the distance criteria for the Completeness
and Robust completeness in Proposition 6.1.
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7.5.3 Decoding
Lemma 7.11. Let (A,B) be an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash. If∥∥x(B) −Π (u)∥∥2
M1
≤ 14Decode for some u ∈ V local, then for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction
of r’s, and every strategy a in the support of (A, r):
• (Error correction) The game verifier can compute the restriction of Π (u) to M1 ∩
J (A,r) correctly.
• (Critical bits) The induced assignment on the critical bits is approximately correct:∥∥∥x(a)critical −Π (u)∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)
= O (Decode) .
• (Extrapolation) The game verifier can also compute the restrictions of Π (Slocal (u))
and Π (P local (u)) to M1 ∩ J (A,r) correctly.
Proof. By analogous argument to Lemma 7.10 (replace Complete with Decode), we have that,
for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of (A, r)’s, sampling ν
(
x
(a)
All |M1
)
satisfies the distance criteria
for the Decoding and Robust decoding in Proposition 6.1. Thus the decoding of Π (u) on
M1 ∩ J (A,r) follows from the “Error-correction on a sample” desideratum of Proposition 6.1.
Critical bits
By the premise, we have that∥∥∥x(B) − C (u)∥∥∥2
M1∩K
= O (Decode) . (23)
Thus, by Corollary 7.8, also ∥∥∥f (A) − C (u)∥∥∥2
M1∩K
= O (Decode) .
By Claims 7.4 and 7.7, for every Nash-optimal a and b we also have that∥∥∥x(a) − C (u)∥∥∥2
M1∩K
= O (Decode) . (24)∥∥∥x(b) − C (u)∥∥∥2
M1∩K
= O (Decode) . (25)
Therefore, we have that for every Nash-optimal a and b, the counter’s encoding C (u) is
decoded correctly; and in particular,
M1 ∩ I(A,r)critical (a) = M1 ∩ I(A,r)critical (b) . (26)
Let U (A,r)critical |M1 denote the portion of U (A,r)critical that is derived from assignments to the
critical bits in the first proof. For every happy player (A, r), and every strategy a in her
support, we have
U
(A,r)
critical |M1 = −Eq∈Gt/2Eb∼B[(B,q)]
[∥∥∥x(a)critical − x(b)∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(b)∩I(B,q)
]
= −Eq∈Gt/2Eb∼B[(B,q)]
[∥∥∥x(a)critical − x(b)∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)∩I(B,q)
]
±O (Nash)
= −
∥∥∥x(a)critical − x(B)∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)
− E
i∈M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)
[
Varb∼B[(B,q(i))]
[
x(b) |i
]]
±O (Nash) ,
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where the second equality follows from (26). Therefore, for every Nash-optimal strategy a,∥∥∥x(a)critical − x(B)∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)
= O
(
2Precision + Nash
)
= O (Nash) . (27)
By the Good Sample guarantee from Proposition 6.1, we have that for a (1− o (1))-fraction
of r’s, ∥∥∥x(B) −Π (u)∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)
= O (Decode) , (28)
Combining with (27), we have that for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of r’s,∥∥∥x(a)critical −Π (u)∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)
= O (Decode) .
Extrapolation
Notice that (28) in particular implies∥∥∥x(B) − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)
= O (Decode) .
Combining with (27), we have that∥∥∥x(a)critical − ν (x(B))∥∥∥2
M1∩I(A,r)critical(a)
= O (Decode) .
Therefore, for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of (A, r)’s, sampling ν
(
x
(a)
critical |M1
)
satisfies the
distance criteria for the Decoding and Robust decoding in Proposition 6.1. Therefore, by the
“Error-correction on the critical bits” desideratum, for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of (A, r)’s,
the PCP verifier correctly decodes the assignment to all the critical bits.
From the assignment to the critical bits, the PCP verifier can reconstruct the complete
difference vector E (u)−E (Slocal (u)). So now, accessing E (Slocal (u)) is equivalent to ac-
cessing E (u) (with the same error guarantees). Using the local proof construction guarantee
from Proposition 6.1, the PCP verifier can correctly compute pi (Slocal (u)) on I(A,r)Sample. Fi-
nally, recall that once the PCP verifier successfully decoded C (u), it can also locally compute
C (Slocal (u)).
7.6 Default displacement
The simplest case is when the restrictions of x(B) to both proofs are far from any Π (u) ,Π (v).
In this case x(B) is far from all Brouwer line segments, and f (A) needs to apply the default
displacement.
Lemma 7.12. If (A,B) is an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash, and both∥∥x(B) −Π (u)∥∥2
M1
> 4Sound and
∥∥x(B) −Π (v)∥∥2
M2
> 4Sound for every u, v ∈ V local, then∥∥f (A) − f (x(B))∥∥2
M
= O (Nash).
Proof. By Lemma 7.9, for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of r’s and every strategy a in their sup-
port, the game verifier rejects both proofs. In this case, for all those a’s, f (a) implements
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the default displacement. If a is also an Nash-optimal strategy, then
∥∥x(a) − x(B)∥∥2
J(A,r)
=
O (Nash), in which case also∥∥∥f (a) − f (x(B))∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash) .
Since the rest of Alice’s players can have at most an O (Nash) effect, we have that∥∥∥f (A) − f (x(B))∥∥∥2
M
= O (Nash) .
The following cases are handled with minor modifications:
• x(B) is outside the picture and far from the first line (z2 → (Π (u0) ,Π (u0) , 0, 0)).
• x(B) is inside the picture, both x(B) |M1 and x(B) |M2 are close to valid proofs, but
x(B) |M3,4 doesn’t match any Brouwer line segment or vertex.
• x(B) is inside the picture, both x(B) |M1 and x(B) |M2 are close to valid proofs Π (u) and
Π (v), but u and v are not consecutive vertices in the LocalEndOfALine graph.
7.7 Close to a line (1)
Now suppose that x(B) is close to some Brouwer line segment (s→ t) from s =
(Π (u) ,Π (u) , 0, 0) to t = (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 0, 0), for u, v ∈ V local such that v is the
LocalEndOfALine-successor of u. (The case of a line from (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 1, 0) to
(Π (v) ,Π (v) , 0, 1) follows with minor modifications.) Now, the line (s→ t) consists of points
of the form βs + (1− β) t (for β ∈ [0, 1]). From player (A, r)’s assignment to M1, we can
locally decode and verify Π (u) on I(A,r)PCP ∪ I(A,r)LTC ∪K. Furthermore, we can reconstruct both
Π (u) and Π (v) on I(A,r)Sample ∪K. Let s(a), t(a) denote the locally reconstructed restrictions of
s, t, respectively, to J (A,r).
If all the tests passed, then we want to locally apply the displacement close to a line,
as defined in (1). The assignments of x(a), s(a), t(a) also induce a partial vector z(a),
which is the point closest to x(a) on the line segment
(
s(a) → t(a)). We can also use∥∥x(a) − z(a)∥∥
J(A,r)
,
∥∥t(a) − s(a)∥∥
J(A,r)
as estimates of ‖x− z‖M , ‖t− s‖M .
Lemma 7.13. Let (A,B) be an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash. Suppose that x(B)
is somewhat close to some Brouwer line segment,
2Complete < min
β
∥∥∥x(B) − (Π (u) , βΠ (u) + (1− β) Π (v) , 0, 0)∥∥∥2
M
< Decode, (29)
but far from its endpoints,∥∥∥x(B) − (Π (u) ,Π (u) , 0, 0)∥∥∥
M
> 2
√
h∥∥∥x(B) − (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 0, 0)∥∥∥
M
> 2
√
h, (30)
where u, v ∈ V local satisfy v = Slocal (u) and u = P local (v).
Then
∥∥f (A) − f (x(B))∥∥2
M
= O (Nash).
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Proof. By Lemma 7.11, for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of r’s, and every strategy a in the
support of (A, r), the game verifier can compute Π (u) |
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
and Π (v) |
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
correctly;
let Π̂ (u) and Π̂ (v) denote the respective results of those computations.
Consider
β
(a)
(s→t) , arg minβ
∥∥∥x(a) − (βΠ̂ (u) + (1− β) Π̂ (v))∥∥∥2
M2∩
(
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
) . (31)
and
z
(
β
(a)
(s→t)
)
,
(
Π (u) , β
(a)
(s→t)Π (u) +
(
1− β(a)(s→t)
)
Π (v) , 0, 0
)
∈ [−1, 2]M ;
By (29), we have ∥∥∥∥x(B) − z(β(a)(s→t))∥∥∥∥2
M
> 2Complete. (32)
By the Good Sample guarantee from Proposition 6.1, whenever Π (u) |
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
and
Π (v) |
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
are indeed decoded correctly,
∥∥∥x(a) − z(a)∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
> 2Complete −O (Nash) (3h)2 .
Therefore, for all those a’s, we have that f (a) correctly applies the default displacement.
Lemma 7.14. Let (A,B) be an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash. Suppose that x(B)
is close to some Brouwer line segment,
min
β
∥∥∥x(B) − (Π (u) , βΠ (u) + (1− β) Π (v) , 0, 0)∥∥∥2
M
≤ 2Complete, (33)
but far from its endpoints,∥∥∥x(B) − (Π (u) ,Π (u) , 0, 0)∥∥∥
M
> 2
√
h∥∥∥x(B) − (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 0, 0)∥∥∥
M
> 2
√
h, (34)
where u, v ∈ V local satisfy v = Slocal (u) and u = P local (v).
Then
∥∥f (A) − f (x(B))∥∥2
M
= O (Nash).
Proof. We show that f (a) correctly implements the displacement close to a line (Subsection
7.7) for s = (Π (u) ,Π (u) , 0, 0) and t = (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 0, 0).
By Lemma 7.10, for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of r’s, and every strategy a in the sup-
port of (A, r), the game verifier accepts a |{1,...,m}. Furthermore, by Lemma 7.11, it can
compute Π (u) |
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
and Π (v) |
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
correctly; we again denote the partial proofs
locally computed by the game verifier Π̂ (u) and Π̂ (v). Denote the induced partial vec-
tors s(a) and t(a). Recall that for every -optimal a,
∥∥x(a) − x(B)∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash), and
also,
∣∣∥∥s(a) − t(a)∥∥
J(A,r)
− ‖s− t‖M
∣∣2 = o (1).
Let
β
(a)
(s→t) ,
(
t(a) − s(a))∥∥s(a) − t(a)∥∥
J(A,r)
·
(
x(a) − s(a)
)
,
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where the (·) denotes a J (A,r)-restricted dot-product.
For every -optimal a,
∥∥x(a) − x(B)∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash); for most of them Π (u) |I(A,r)Sample∪K
and Π (v) |
I
(A,r)
Sample∪K
are also computed correctly, so s(a), t(a) are the correct restrictions of
s, t to J (A,r). Then, by the Good Sample guarantee from Proposition 6.1, we have that with
probability (1− o (1)), the J (A,r)-restricted dot-product is a good approximation. Namely,∣∣∣(t(a) − s(a)) · (x(B) |J(A,r) −s(a))− (t− s) · (x(B) − s)∣∣∣ = o (1)
and ∣∣∣(t(a) − s(a)) · (x(a) − x(B) |J(A,r))∣∣∣ = O (∥∥∥x(a) − x(B)∥∥∥
J(A,r)
)
= O (
√
Nash) ,
and thus also∣∣∣(t(a) − s(a)) · (x(a) − s(a))− (t− s) · (x(B) − s)∣∣∣ = O (√Nash) .
Because Π (·) is a constant relative distance error correcting code, ‖s− t‖M = Θ (1).
Therefore, ∣∣∣β(a)(s→t) − β(s→t) (x(B))∣∣∣2 = O (Nash) .
In particular, let
z(a) , β(a)(s→t)s
(a) +
(
1− β(a)(s→t)
)
t(a)
z , β(s→t)
(
x(B)
)
s+
(
1− β(s→t)
(
x(B)
))
t;
then for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of r’s, we have∥∥∥z(a) − z∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash) .
By the triangle inequality, also:∣∣∣∥∥∥x(a) − z(a)∥∥∥
J(A,r)
−
∥∥∥x(B) − z∥∥∥
J(A,r)
∣∣∣2 = O (Nash) ,
and thus by the Good Sample guarantee also∣∣∣∥∥∥x(a) − z(a)∥∥∥
J(A,r)
−
∥∥∥x(B) − z∥∥∥
M
∣∣∣2 = O (Nash) .
Finally, whenever a is Nash-optimal and satisfies all the above, we have by Lipschitz
continuity that: ∥∥∥f (a) − f (x(B))∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash) .
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7.8 Close to a line (2)
There are a few different scenarios where we expect the game verifier to accept both proofs:
• x(B) may still be far from every Brouwer line segment; e.g. because the corresponding
vertices are not neighbors in the LocalEndOfALine graph, or the values on M3,4
don’t match.
• x(B) may be close to the “first” Brouwer line segment, where only the special direction
(M4) changes.
• x(B) may be close to a Brouwer line segment where only the Compute-vs-Copy bit (M3)
changes.
• or x(B) may be close to a Brouwer vertex.
In the first case, simply apply the default displacement. In this subsection we briefly describe
the two cases corresponding to x(B) close to a single Brouwer line segment. Finally, the case
where x(B) is close to a Brouwer vertex is deferred to Subsection 7.9.
Close to the first line
Near the “first” Brouwer line segment, locally computing the displacement is relatively simple.
First observe that this case is easy to recognize by local access: by the Good Sample guarantee
from Proposition 6.1, we can estimate the hamming distance of the first 2m + 1 coordinates
to (Π (u0) ,Π (u0) , 0). Furthermore we know s = z2 and t = (Π (u0) ,Π (u0) , 0, 0) exactly,
and therefore also ‖t− s‖M = 1. Finally, let z(a) be equal to (Π (u0) ,Π (u0) , 0) on its first
2m+ 1 coordinates, and x(a) |M4 on the last one.
Close to a line that updates the auxiliary compute-vs-copy bit
Suppose that x(B) is close to a Brouwer line segment from s = (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 0, 0) to t =
(Π (u) ,Π (v) , 1, 0), for u, v ∈ V local such that v is the LocalEndOfALine-successor of u.
(The case of a Brouwer line segment from (Π (v) ,Π (v) , 1, 0) to (Π (v) ,Π (v) , 0, 0) follows with
minor modifications.)
By Lemma 7.11, we can locally decode both Π (u) and Π (v) (and verify that they are
valid proofs of consecutive vertices in the LocalEndOfALine graph). We can therefore
construct partial vectors s(a), t(a) which are equal, for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of (A, r)’s, to
the restrictions of the true s, t to J (A,r). Finally, let
z(a) ,
(
x(a) |M3
)
t(a) +
(
1− x(a) |M3
)
s(a).
7.9 Close to a vertex
In this subsection we consider the case where x(B) is close to a Brouwer vertex representing two
different LocalEndOfALine vertices. In particular, we assume that it is close to a Brouwer
vertex of the form y = (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 1, 0). The case of (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 0, 0) follows with minor
modifications; we will return to the cases of (Π (u) ,Π (u) , 0, 0) and (Π (v) ,Π (v) , 1, 0) in a
couple of paragraphs.
After the game verifier accepts both proofs and that v is the successor of u in the Local-
EndOfALine graph, we are assured that x(B) is indeed close to some Brouwer vertex y. Fur-
thermore, we know that there is an incoming Brouwer line segment from s = (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 1, 0)
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and an outgoing Brouwer line segment to t = (Π (v) ,Π (v) , 1, 0). We can locally compute
s,y, t on J (A,r) with high probability; denote the resulting partial vectors s(a),y(a), t(a).
Alternatively, consider the case where y = (Π (v) ,Π (v) , 1, 0) (similarly
for (Π (u) ,Π (u) , 0, 0)), with an incoming Brouwer line segment from s =
(Π (P local (v)) ,Π (v) , 1, 0) and outgoing Brouwer line segment to t = (Π (v) ,Π (v) , 0, 0). By
the Error-correction guarantee in Lemma 7.11, we can (with high probability over r) locally
decode partial vectors y(a) and t(a) on J (A,r); furthermore, by the Extrapolation guarantee
in the same lemma, we can locally compute s(a).
It is left to show that we can also locally compute the more involved construction of
displacement next to a Brouwer vertex.
We know ‖y − t‖M = 1/2 exactly, and we can estimate ‖s− y‖M from
∥∥s(a) − y(a)∥∥
J(A,r)
.
Now, we can locally compute z(s→y) and z(y→t) on the coordinates J (A,r) for which we know
the value of s,y, t; denote those partial vectors z(a)(s→y) and z
(a)
(y→t), respectively.
Recall that
∆(s→y) (x) =
(y − s)
‖s− y‖M
· (x− s)−
(
1−
√
h
)
∆(y→t) (x) =
√
h− (t− y)‖y − t‖M
· (x− y) .
We can use x(a), s(a),y(a), t(a) to locally compute estimates ∆(a)(s→y) (x) and ∆
(a)
(y→t) (x), and
therefore also α(a) ≈ α (x(B)) and z(a) , α(a)z(a)(s→y) + (1− α(a)) z(a)(y→t).
Lemma 7.15. Let (A,B) be an (Nash, Nash)-Well-Supported-WeakNash, and let∥∥x(B) − (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 1, 0)∥∥
M
≤ 2√h for u, v ∈ V local such that v = Slocal (u) and
u = P local (v). Then
∥∥f (a) − f (x(B))∥∥2
M
= O (Nash/h).
Proof. By Lemmata 7.11 and 7.10, we have that for a (1−O (Nash))-fraction of (A, r)’s
and every strategy a in their supports, the game verifier recognizes that x(a) is close to
some Brouwer vertex y , (Π (u) ,Π (v) , 1, 0). In particular, by the Error-correction desider-
atum in Lemma 7.11, the game verifier can construct y(a), s(a), t(a) ∈ {0, 1,⊥}M that, for a
(1−O (Nash))-fraction of (A, r)’s and every strategy a in their supports, are equal to y, s, t
on J (A,r).
We also know ‖y − t‖M = 1/2 exactly, and by the Good Sample guarantee from Proposi-
tion 6.1, ∣∣∣∥∥∥y(a) − t(a)∥∥∥
J(A,r)
− ‖y − t‖M
∣∣∣2 = o (1) .
Furthermore, as we argue in the proof of Lemma 7.14,∣∣∣β(a)(s→y) − β(s→y) (x(B))∣∣∣2 = O (Nash)∣∣∣β(a)(y→t) − β(y→t) (x(B))∣∣∣2 = O (Nash) . (35)
Let ∆(a)(s→y) , β
(a)
(s→y) −
(
1−√h
)
, and ∆(a)(y→t) ,
√
h − β(y→t). If either quantity is neg-
ative, continue with the displacement close to a line as in Subsection 7.7. Recall that f is
O (1)-Lipschitz on [−1, 2]M , and in particular near the interface between the line and vertex
displacements (the hyperplanes defined by β(s→y) (x) = 0 and β(y→t) (x) = 0). Therefore,
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whenever all the parameters are computed approximately correctly, the displacement is also
approximately correct - even if near the interface we use the vertex displacement instead of
the line displacement or vice versa. We henceforth focus on ∆(a)(s→y),∆
(a)
(y→t) ≥ 0.
Define
α(a) ,
∆
(a)
(y→t)
∆
(a)
(y→t) + ∆
(a)
(s→y)
,
and finally also
z(B) , α
(
x(B)
)
z(s→y) +
(
1− α
(
x(B)
))
z(y→t)
z(a) , α(a)z(a)(s→y) +
(
1− α(a)
)
z
(a)
(y→t). (36)
We now consider two different cases depending on the value of
∥∥x(B) − z(B)∥∥
M
:
Case
∥∥x(B) − z(B)∥∥
M
> 10h:
The challenge is that when
∥∥x(B) − z(B)∥∥
M
is huge, ∆(y→t) +∆(s→y) may be very small, which
could lead to α(a) being far from the true α
(
x(B)
)
. Fortunately, in this case the true gˆ
(
x(B)
)
is just the default displacement, δ (02m+1, 1) - so we only have to argue that f (a) also applies
the default displacement (for most players (A, r)).
Observe that if α
(
x(B)
)
= 1/2, the point on Ly which is closest to x(B) is indeed z(B).
In general, this is not true, but
∥∥x(B) − z(B)∥∥
M
is at most
√
2-times larger than the distance
from x(B) to Ly. In particular, for any z(α
(a)) , α(a)z(s→y) +
(
1− α(a)) z(y→t), we have that∥∥∥x(B) − z(α(a))∥∥∥
M
> 7h.
Therefore by the Good Sample guarantee from Proposition 6.1 and Claim 7.5, for a
(1−O (Nash))-fraction of (A, r)’s and every strategy a in their supports, we have∥∥∥x(a) − z(a)∥∥∥
J(A,r)
> 7h−O (Nash) ;
For all those a’s, f (a) correctly implements the default displacement.
Case
∥∥x(B) − z(B)∥∥
M
≤ 10h:
From (35), ∣∣∣∆(a)(s→y) −∆(s→y) (x(B))∣∣∣2 = O (Nash)∣∣∣∆(a)(y→t) −∆(y→t) (x(B))∣∣∣2 = O (Nash) .
Plugging into (4), we have that
∆
(a)
(s→y) + ∆
(a)
(y→t) ≥
√
h−O (h) ,
and therefore also ∣∣∣α(a) − α(x(B))∣∣∣2 = O (Nash/h) .
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Similarly, also10 ∥∥∥z(a) − z(B)∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash/h) .
Finally, whenever a is Nash-optimal and satisfies all the above, we have∥∥∥f (a) − f (x(B))∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash/h) .
8 From polymatrix to bimatrix
In this section we complete the proof of our main result, Theorem 1.2, by reducing from
multiplayer polymatrix games (a-la Theorem 7.1) to two-player games.
8.1 From (
√
+ , δ)-Well-Supported-WeakNash to (, δ)-WeakNash
Lemma 8.1. Consider a complete bipartite polymatrix game such that every two adjacent ver-
tices play a bimatrix subgame with payoffs in [0, 1/nB], [0, 1/nA], where nA, nB are respective
the numbers of players on the two sides of the bipartite game. Given an (, δ)-WeakNash, we
can construct in polynomial time a (
√
 · (√+ 5) , δ)-Well-Supported-WeakNash.
Proof. Let (VA;VB) be the sets of players, where each v ∈ VA ∪ VB has utility Uv and action
set Sv. Let x = (xvs) ∈ ∆ (×v∈VA∪VBSv) be an (, δ)-WeakNash. Finally, let Uvmax (x−v) =
maxs∈Sv Uvs (x−v). Since this is a polymatrix game, we can write
∀v ∈ VA Uvs (x) =
∑
u∈VB
Uv,us (x
u) ,
∀v ∈ VB Uvs (x) =
∑
u∈VA
Uv,us (x
u) .
Let k = k () > 0 be some large number do be specified later. We construct our new
approximate equilibrium as follows. For each of the (1− δ) players who play -optimally in
x, we take only the strategies that are within k of the optimum:
xˆvs =
{
xvs
1−zv ifU
v
s (x
−v) ≥ Uvmax (x−v)− k
0 otherwise
where zv is the total probability that player v assigns to strategies that are more than k away
from the optimum.
The above division is well-defined because for k > 1 and v who plays -optimally, zv is
bounded away from 1. Moreover, the following claim from [32] formalizes the intuition that
when k is sufficiently large, the total weight on actions removed is small, so xˆv is close to xv:
Claim 8.2. ([32, Claim 6])
∀v ∈ VA ∪ VB
∑
s∈Sv
|xˆvs − xvs | ≤
2
k − 1
10In fact, we actually have
∥∥∥z(a) − z(B)∥∥∥2
J(A,r)
= O (Nash), because α interpolates between z(s→y) and
z(y→t), which are already at distance O
(√
h
)
from each other.
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Now, the total change to the expected payoff of player v for each action s, is bounded by
the total change in mixed strategies of its neighbors. In the following let v ∈ VA; the analogous
argument for the utility of players in VB follows with minor modifications.∣∣Uvs (x−v)− Uvs (xˆ−v)∣∣ ≤ ∑
u∈VB
|Uv,us (xu)− Uv,us (xˆu)|
≤ 1
nB
·
∑
u∈VB
∑
s∈Su
|xˆus − xus | ≤
2
k − 1
It follows that xˆ is a
(
k+ 2k−1 , δ
)
-Well-Supported-WeakNash:
Uvs
(
xˆ−v
) ≥ Uvs (x−v)− 2k − 1 ≥ Uvmax (x−v)− k − 2k − 1 ≥ Uvmax (xˆ−v)− k − 4k − 1
Finally, take k = 1 + 1/
√
 to get that
k+
4
k − 1 ≤
√
 · (√+ 5)
8.2 From (, δ)-WeakNash to Θ ( · δ)-ANE in a bimatrix game
Lemma 8.3. Suppose we are given a complete bipartite polymatrix game between n1/2+o(1) ver-
tices with 2n1/2+o(1) actions each; the payoffs in each bimatrix game are in [0, 1/nB] , [0, 1/nA],
where nA, nB denote the number of players on each side of the bipartite graph. Then we
can construct a bimatrix game of size 2n1/2+o(1) such that every -ANE of the new bimatrix
game corresponds to a (δ, polymatrix)-WeakNash of the polymatrix game, for sufficiently small
 = Θ
(
δ2 · 2polymatrix
)
Proof. The two players play three games simultaneously: the main game, which is the heart
of the reduction; and two games based on a construction due to Althofer [4], which impose
structural properties of any approximate Nash equilibrium.
Main game We let each of the two players “control” the vertices on one side of the
bipartite graphical game.
Alice’s actions correspond to a choice of vertex on her side of the polymatrix game, and
an action for that player. Similarly, Bob’s actions correspond to a a choice of vertex on his
side, and a choice of action for that vertex. The utility for each player is the utility to the
corresponding vertex from the induced subgame, scaled by a factor of λ ·nB or λ ·nA for Alice
or Bob, respectively. Here λ  is a small constant do be defined later.
Althofer games In addition to the main game, we use a construction due to Althofer
[4] to introduce two auxiliary games that force the player to spread their mixed strategies
approximately evenly across all vertices. Althofer’s original game is a one-sum game with
payoffs in {0, 1} and size k× ( kk/2). In each column, exactly half of the entries are 1’s, and the
rest are 0’s. For example for k = 4, the payoff matrices are given by:
R = 1− C =

1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0

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The value of this game is 1/2.
For our purposes, we consider two instantiations of Althofer’s gadget: a “primal” Althofer
game of size nA×
( nA
nA/2
)
. and a “dual” Althofer game of size
( nB
nB/2
)×nB. In any (approximate)
Nash, both Alice and Bob must mix (approximately) evenly among (almost) all of their actions.
The final construction Finally, we compose all three games together by identifying
Alice’s choice of vertex in the main game with her choice of row in the primal Althofer game,
and Bob’s choice of vertex in the main game with his choice of column in the dual Althofer
game.
Analysis Alice’s and Bob’s respective mixed strategies induce a mixed strategy profile (A,B)
on their vertices: Alice’s vertex (A, i)’s action is drawn from Alice’s action conditioned on
picking (A, i), and analogously for Bob’s (B, j). For any vertex that is never picked by its
player, fix an arbitrary strategy. Our goal is to show that (A,B) is a (δ, polymatrix)-WeakNash
of the polymatrix game.
Let U (A,i) (A [(A, i)] ,B) denote (A, i)’s expected utility when all players draw their strate-
gies according to (A,B), and analogously for U (B,j) (B [(B, j)] ,A).
By Lemma 2.1, in every λ-ANE (and in particular in any -ANE), Alice’s and Bob’s
respective marginal distributions over their vertices are O (λ)-close to uniform. Therefore,
Alice’s expected utilities from the main game satisfy∣∣∣UAMain − λEi∈[nA]U (A,i) (A [(A, i)] ,B)∣∣∣ = O (λ2) .
Suppose by contradiction that Alice and Bob are in an -ANE in the bimatrix game, but a
δ-fraction of Alice’s vertices have an polymatrix-deviating strategy in the polymatrix game.
Let
(
Â,B
)
denote the deviating mixed strategy profile (notice that the deviation of a player
on Alice’s side does not affect the utilities of other player on the same side).
(
Â,B
)
induces,
without changing the marginal distributions over vertices, a profile of mixed strategies for
Alice and Bob; Alice’s new expected utility from the main game, ÛAMain, also satisfies∣∣∣ÛAMain − λEi∈[nA]U (A,i) (Â [(A, i)] ,B)∣∣∣ = O (λ2)
Therefore,
ÛAMain ≥ λEi∈[nA]U (A,i)
(
Â [(A, i)] , B̂
)
−O (λ2)
≥ λEi∈[nA]U (A,i) (A [(A, i)] ,B) + λδ · polymatrix −O
(
λ2
)
≥ UAMain + λδ · polymatrix −O
(
λ2
)
.
Set λδ · polymatrix−O
(
λ2
)
> . Since Alice and Bob have not changed their marginal vertex
utilities, this is an -deviating strategy.
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